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I. INTRODUCTION
Planning moratoria are freezes on land development imposed for
land-use planning purposes. Recently, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,1 the United States
Supreme Court considered whether landowners subjected to such
moratoria would be entitled to compensation under the Takings
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.2 The Court concluded that sometimes they might and sometimes they might not.3
The decision’s overarching theme was the need for fairness, which
the majority enshrined in the new term “Armstrong principles.”4
While it commended good planning, Tahoe-Sierra did not promise
that planning moratoria would be exempt from meaningful judicial
review. To the contrary, it expressed outright “skepticism” of extended moratoria and provided a roadmap for challenges to planning
moratoria in future cases. The Court noted:
It is worth emphasizing that we do not reject a categorical rule
in this case because a 32-month moratorium is just not that harsh.
Instead, we reject a categorical rule because we conclude that the
Penn Central framework adequately directs the inquiry to the
proper considerations—only one of which is the length of the delay.5

1. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
3. 535 U.S. at 337.
4. Id. at 321 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). For a
treatment of fairness in Armstrong and other Supreme Court cases, see infra Part III.A.
5. Id. at 338 n.34.
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This basic theme of Tahoe-Sierra has been obscured, partly because of dicta supporting regulation6 but primarily because the Supreme Court reframed the issues when granting review. The Court
inverted the first proposed certiorari question, which was most directly responsive to the decision below, and discarded the others.7
The petitioner, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. (TSPC), represented some 400 small landowners.8 TSPC sought review of a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that seemed
predicated on the theory that planning moratoria never constitute
regulatory takings.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however,
essentially to review whether planning moratoria always constitute
regulatory takings.10
Not surprisingly, the Court responded in the negative. In rejecting
petitioners’ per se rule, Justice Stevens wrote for the six to three majority,11 “[W]e do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it should not be given exclusive significance one way or the
other.”12
The principal outcome of Tahoe-Sierra is a vindication of the
TSPC’s fundamental premise: planning moratoria may constitute
takings. Additionally, the Court explicitly confirmed that partial
regulatory takings may require just compensation, which would
benefit landowners.13 Furthermore, it specified “seven theories” upon
which landowners might prevail in future cases.14
The facts in Tahoe-Sierra are complex, and its procedural history
is long and convoluted.15 In retrospect, much of its outcome seems
preordained by the iconic nature of Lake Tahoe, the practical constraints on the ability of the landowners to develop their case, and
6. See infra Part II.D.
7. See infra Part II.B.2 and text accompanying note 75.
8. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312.
9. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216
F.3d 764, 778 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). For clarity, references to the various Ninth Circuit opinions, all styled Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, will be cited hereinafter as TSPC followed by a Roman numeral designating
its sequence number. District court opinions will be designated simply TSPC.
10. See infra Part II.B.2. and text accompanying note 76.
11. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337. The opinion was joined by O’Connor, Kennedy,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Id. at 302. The principal dissenting opinion was written
by Rehnquist, C.J., joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ. Id. at 343. Justice Thomas filed a
short dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Id. at 355.
12. Id. at 337.
13. See infra Part II.D.6.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. For an excellent exposition, see J. David Breemer, Temporary Insanity: The Long
Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and Its Quiet Ending in the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2002).
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the procedural rulings below. Thus, the TSPC landowners were unable to utilize the potential advantages that Tahoe-Sierra now makes
available to others. Tahoe-Sierra provides support for good planning
and eschews bright-line rules. It also provides future plaintiffs a
strong platform upon which landowners can mount regulatory takings challenges against unreasonable planning moratoria.
This Article discusses the Tahoe-Sierra decision16 and analyzes
the Supreme Court’s reinvigorated fairness principle.17 The heart of
the Article, however, is a discussion of where Tahoe-Sierra is apt to
take us. This takes the form of a theoretical and practical treatment
of how landowners can use the case’s seven theories roadmap to protect property rights.18
II. THE TAHOE-SIERRA CONTROVERSY AND DECISION
A. Complex Problems in a Beautiful Land
1. The Tahoe Basin—Beauty and Complexity
Lake Tahoe is an alpine lake located in the northern Sierra Nevada mountains of Northern California and Nevada.19 It is renowned
for the striking clarity of its depths and beautiful mountain surroundings. The U.S. district court referred to it as “almost indescribably beautiful.”20 The Nevada and California Supreme Courts
have been equally effusive.21 Mark Twain referred to the area as “the
fairest picture the whole earth affords.”22 TSPC joined in this
praise,23 and the U.S. Supreme Court correctly concluded that “[a]ll
agree that Lake Tahoe is ‘uniquely beautiful,’”24 and that it is a “‘national treasure that must be protected and preserved.’”25

16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000),
aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
20. Id.
21. Kelly v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 855 P.2d 1027, 1034 (Nev. 1993) (describing
the lake as a national treasure); People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 487 P.2d
1193, 1194 (Cal. 1971) (describing the Tahoe Basin as “an area of unique and unsurpassed
beauty”).
22. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 187 (Hamlin Hill ed., Penguin Books 1981) (1872).
The district court opinion collects similar Twain quotes. See TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
23. Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1692011, at *3 (“Lake Tahoe is a
unique treasure.”).
24. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307 (quoting TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230).
25. Id. (quoting TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1230).
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There has been equal unanimity that, as the California Supreme
Court observed in 1971, “the region’s natural wealth contains the virus of its ultimate impoverishment.”26 TSPC shared that view,27 as
did the district court.28 “Part of what makes Tahoe so special,” the
district court explained, “is the amazing clarity of its water, which, as
a result of its clarity, is an unusually beautiful cobalt blue color.”29
Most lakes have lacked such clarity because of algae growing in their
depths. The presence of algae, in turn, requires a nutrient-rich environment. Lake Tahoe, however, historically has been lacking in both
nitrogen and phosphorous, both of which algae require.30
By the late 1950s, however, development had led to increased
runoff and nutrient loading, causing erosion and a proliferation of algae that threatened Lake Tahoe’s clarity. The inadequacy of local efforts to deal with these problems led, in 1968, to the enactment of the
Tahoe Regional Planning Compact.31 The Compact created the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency (TRPA), which was “to coordinate and
regulate development in the Basin and to conserve its natural resources.”32 From the outset, landowners have complained that TRPA
has acted in ways that “destroyed the economic value” of their property.33
TRPA was directed in 1980 to develop regional standards for air,
water quality, soil conservation, and vegetation preservation within
eighteen months. TRPA had a year thereafter to adopt an amended
regional plan to achieve those standards. In order to prevent inconsistent development, the regional planning compact also provided for
a moratorium on development until adoption of the final plan or,
“[u]nder a liberal reading of the Compact, . . . until August 26,
1983.”34 Realizing that it would be unable to meet this deadline,
TRPA adopted Resolution 83-21, which suspended all project reviews
and approvals until November 26, 1983. When even this time proved
insufficient, the TRPA staff bridged the gap between this expiring
moratorium and its contemplated replacement with nothing more
26. Younger, 487 P.2d at 1195.
27. See Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL
1692011, at *3.
28. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226. “Ironically, the more Lake Tahoe comes to be appreciated for its beauty, the more that beauty is threatened.” Id. at 1230.
29. Id. at 1230.
30. Id. at 1231.
31. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309 (citing 1968 Cal. Stat. 998, p.1900, § 1; NEV. REV.
STAT. 277.200 (1968) p. 4, and Congressional approval in 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat.
360 (1969)).
32. Id. (quoting Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S.
391, 394 (1979)).
33. See Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. at 394 (holding agency amenable to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983).
34. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
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than administrative fiat. The staff simply notified TRPA’s board
that, absent instructions to the contrary, they would refuse to process development applications as if the expired moratorium remained
in effect.35 The Supreme Court notes in the facts that “Resolution 8321 was in effect from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984. As a result of these two directives, virtually all development on a substantial portion of the property subject to TRPA’s jurisdiction was prohibited for a period of 32 months.”36
On the day that the 1984 replacement plan was to go into effect,
California challenged it as insufficiently restricting residential construction. An injunction against implementation was issued by the
U.S. district court, which remained in effect until a new plan was
adopted in 1987.37 The revised 1987 plan remains in effect today.38
2. The Affected Landowners
In part because judicial consideration of development moratoria
after Tahoe-Sierra will largely be concerned with considerations of
fairness,39 it is useful to consider the identity of the landowners comprising the petitioner, TSPC. Unlike the owners of large and expensive homes along the shore, the Tahoe-Sierra landowners were individuals of modest means who had purchased vacant lots in subdivisions in the hills above the lake prior to 1980, but who did not build
or obtain vested rights before the effective date of the 1980 compact.40
The Petitioners—some 400 owners of individual, lawfully subdivided, single-family residential lots around Lake Tahoe—are
mostly married couples who bought their lots years ago for individual retirement, vacation, or permanent homes for themselves
and their families. The lots were all located in partially developed
residential neighborhoods with paved roads, utility service, and
35. Id. at 1236.
36. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 306.
37. Id. at 312.
38. While not adjudicating the 1987 plan here, the Court considered it in Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997). There, another owner of a small
parcel in a mostly-developed upland zone was denied the right to build, although the landowners were given some transferable development rights. The Court ruled that, after a
decade of litigation, the landowner could assert a takings claim without selling the rights
first. Id. at 725-26. Rather than continue litigating, the elderly owner settled.
39. See infra Part III.F.
40. See, e.g., Eric Bailey, The State Lake Stays Blue but Critics of Panel See Red Environment, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2002, at B5. The article states that:
[H]omes in excess of 10,000 square feet have continued to sprout on the shoreline. . . . “We’re seeing nothing but these monster mega homes,” said [an area
resident], who worries that the huge structures—and the floating piers, docks
and storage buildings that go along with them—threaten to trample what remains of the lake’s rocky shoreline. Affordable housing, meanwhile, is virtually
nonexistent.
Id.
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homes built on many of the neighboring lots. All of the landowners
bought their lots many years before the regulations challenged
here were even being considered.41

From the imposition of the first moratorium in 1981 until the present day, many owners of vacant lots have not been permitted to
build. Some owners have died42 and others have sold to TRPA for low
prices set by the agency.43 TSPC agreed that construction led to the
problem and that “[t]he solution, curbing development, was obvious.”44 The basis for the litigation, according to TSPC, was “not the
regulatory ends” sought in curtailing growth, “but rather the unconstitutional means employed by TRPA.”45
B. The Tahoe-Sierra Litigation
1. Convoluted Proceedings
The Tahoe-Sierra litigation was protracted over more than two
decades. There were numerous published and unpublished district
court decisions in California and Nevada,46 and four published Ninth
Circuit decisions.47 The Supreme Court focused on one Nevada U.S.
District Court holding,48 and its reversal by a panel of the Ninth Circuit.49 The Court also noted the Ninth Circuit’s denial of review en
banc,50 from which Judge Alex Kozinski’s stinging dissent was likely
an important factor in the decision to grant certiorari.
The district court opinion began by considering whether the planning moratoria would constitute a taking under the traditional
41. Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL
1692011, at *2.
42. Gideon Kanner, Temporary Takings, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 12, 2001, at A21 (noting
that the case originally was brought by “some 700 individual lot owners (now whittled
down by death to some 400)”).
43. Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1692001,
at *7 n.8 (asserting that “the majority of the landowners succumbed and were forced to sell
there [sic] parcels for a fraction of their fair market value to one of these scavenging agencies which paid only the bare residual value of unusable land”).
44. Id. at 3.
45. Id.
46. See Breemer, supra note 15, at 7 n.45, 8-9.
47. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC I), 911
F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1990), later proceeding, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency (TSPC II), 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. l991), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
remanded, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC III), 34
F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 1994), rev’d in part, remanded, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
48. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d,
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
49. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d 764.
50. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V), 228
F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (reh’g en banc denied).
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analysis set forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City.51 The Penn Central approach requires a court to consider “a
complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the
landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action.”52 Weighing these factors, the district court concluded that no taking occurred.53 However, it added that, although
the prohibition on development “was clearly intended to be temporary, . . . there was no fixed date for when it would terminate.”54
Therefore, the moratoria denied the plaintiffs all economically viable use of their properties.55 This constituted a categorical taking
under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.56 Also requiring
compensation was First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,57 which held that a regulatory taking is compensable even if the taking proves to be only temporary because the regulation is later rescinded or invalidated.58
The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court had
incorrectly applied Lucas and misinterpreted First English.59 Judge
Stephen Reinhardt, writing for the panel, declared that “First English is not even a case about what constitutes a taking.”60 He noted
that the California appellate court had rejected the landowner’s
damages claim “on the ground that, regardless of whether a taking
occurred, the claimants could not recover damages during the period
running from the time of enactment of the ordinance to the time
when it was finally declared unconstitutional.”61 The state appellate
decision was based on the state supreme court’s mandate in Agins v.
City of Tiburon62 that an injunction was the appropriate remedy in
an inverse condemnation action of this type. The U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the California Agins doctrine in First English, holding that
subsequent invalidation of the regulation, “though converting the
taking into a ‘temporary’ one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the

51. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
52. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S.
at 124).
53. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1250.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1245.
56. Id. at 1242-45 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)) (establishing the bright-line
rule that compensation is required whenever a regulation deprives an owner of all economically beneficial uses of the land).
57. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
58. Id. at 318-19.
59. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216
F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
60. Id. at 777.
61. Id. at 777-78 (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 309).
62. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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demands of the Just Compensation Clause.”63 Thus, if the regulation
constituted a taking, the plaintiffs would be entitled to compensation
for the period of time that the regulation remained in effect.64
Judge Reinhardt emphasized that First English “related only to
the remedy available once a taking had been proven.”65 Although
First English held that compensation is required even when a taking
is temporary, he wrote, “the Court stated explicitly that it was not
addressing whether the ordinance constituted a taking.”66 Turning to
this latter question, Reinhardt stated that the moratorium did not
render the plaintiffs’ property valueless: “Given that the ordinance
and resolution banned development for only a limited period, these
regulations preserved the bulk of future developmental use of the
property. This future use had a substantial present value.”67 Because
the moratoria did not deprive the property of all economically beneficial use, Lucas was inapplicable.
Judge Reinhardt did add one qualifier: “Of course, were a temporary moratorium designed to be in force so long as to eliminate all
present value of a property’s future use, we might be compelled to
conclude that a categorical taking had occurred.”68 However, the present value of a parcel of land gradually decreases as the interval
from the present until beneficial enjoyment is to be derived from it
increases. For the present value to equal zero, the time until beneficial enjoyment is to start must equal infinity. In other words, the literal meaning of Reinhardt’s statement is that a temporary moratorium is a categorical deprivation only when it lasts forever.
The Ninth Circuit denied review en banc.69 However, Judge Alex
Kozinski’s dissenting opinion, in which four other judges joined, observed that “[t]he panel does not like the Supreme Court’s Takings
Clause jurisprudence very much, so it reverses First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, and adopts Justice
Stevens’s First English dissent.”70 In First English, Stevens had argued that no taking had occurred because the regulation merely
postponed development of the property for a fraction of its useful life,
and that the economic impact of postponed development was no
greater than the economic impact of a regulation permanently re-

63. First English, 482 U.S. at 319.
64. Id. at 321.
65. TSPC IV, 216 F.3d at 778.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 781.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V), 228
F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2000) (reh’g en banc denied).
70. Id. at 999 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from a denial of a reh’g en banc, joined by
O’Scannlain, Trott, T.G. Nelson, and Kleinfeld, JJ.) (citations omitted).
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stricting the use of only part of the property.71 Judge Kozinski noted
that although the Ninth Circuit did not cite Justice Stevens’s First
English dissent, “the reasoning—and even the wording—bear an uncanny resemblance.”72 “By adopting Justice Stevens’s dissent, the
panel places itself in square conflict with the majority’s opinion in
First English.”73
2. Factors Shaping the Court’s Holding
The Supreme Court’s Tahoe-Sierra opinion recounted the view of
the dissenters from denial of rehearing en banc that the Ninth Circuit panel’s holding was “not faithful” to the holdings of First English
and Lucas and added that certiorari was granted because of “the importance of the case.”74 Using his prerogative as senior justice in the
majority, Stevens assigned the opinion to himself.
Tahoe-Sierra’s narrow ruling was affected, first and foremost, by
the manner in which the Supreme Court shaped its grant of certiorari. The Court did not accept the proffered questions pertaining to
sequential moratoria or to reciprocity in burden sharing. Most importantly, the Court inverted the question they accepted.
As submitted, the certiorari questions read:
1. In light of this Court’s clear holding that a temporary moratorium on land use can require compensation for a temporary taking
of property, is it permissible for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
to hold—as a matter of law—that a temporary moratorium can
never require constitutional compensation?
2. Can a land use regulatory agency escape its constitutional
duty to pay for land taken for public use by the expedient of enacting a series of rolling, back-to-back “temporary” moratoria/prohibitions extending over a period of 20 years, and then
claiming that each of the individual prohibitions on all use must
be viewed in isolation from the others and, when so viewed, none
was severe enough by itself to cross the constitutional taking
threshold?
In similar fashion, can such an agency escape the constitutional
obligation of compensation because a court injunction issued in a
different case barred issuing permits to other landowners, while
the agency’s own regulations precluded all use of the Petitioners’
land?
3. Can a land use regulatory agency purport to “protect the environment” at a major regional location (here, Lake Tahoe) by com-

71. First English, 482 U.S. at 332 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. TSPC V, 228 F.3d at 1000 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
73. Id. at 1002.
74. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
320 (2002).
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pelling a selected group of individual landowners to forego all use
of their individual home sites, and thereby compel a de facto donation of their land for public use without compensation?75

However, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari was “limited to the
following question”:
Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause
of the United States Constitution?76

Reframing the issue in this fashion permitted the Court to focus
solely on whether the two moratoria that were considered by the
Ninth Circuit fell within the Lucas per se test or, alternatively, the
Penn Central ad hoc test.77 This opened the way for Justice Stevens’s
extensive focus on the need for comprehensive review and fairness.
He quoted from Justice O’Connor’s earlier statement that “[t]he
temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in either direction
must be resisted. The Takings Clause requires careful examination
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances in this context.”78
Somewhat at variance with these laudatory comments about the
need for comprehensive review in the context of the landowners’ interests was the Court’s discussion of the specifics of the individual
moratoria:
This case actually involves two moratoria ordered by respondent
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to maintain the status
quo while studying the impact of development on Lake Tahoe and
designing a strategy for environmentally sound growth. The first,
Ordinance 81-5, was effective from August 24, 1981, until August
26, 1983, whereas the second more restrictive Resolution 83-21
was in effect from August 27, 1983, until April 25, 1984. As a result of these two directives, virtually all development on a substantial portion of the property subject to TRPA’s jurisdiction was
prohibited for a period of 32 months.79

However, if Resolution 83-21 remained “in effect” until April 25,
1984, it did so only through extralegal means. By its terms, Resolution 83-21 expired on November 26, 1983. As the U.S. district court
explained, “the ban was extended—although not by any affirmative
75. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 001167) (citation to First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987) omitted) (emphasis in original).
76. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948
(2001) (granting certiorari in part for 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000)).
77. Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003; Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104; see infra Part II.D.6.
78. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (second emphasis added).
79. Id. at 306.

440

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:429

action by TRPA, and not, contrary to what the defendants have implied, for any set period of time.”80
TRPA staff members advised the Board that the end of the ninetyday period was approaching, and that absent an order by the Board
to the contrary, the staff would continue to observe the moratorium.81
Since the Board never took any action in response to this “advice,”
the moratorium was, in fact, continued in effect by the staff.
Finally, however, on April 26, 1984, a new regional plan was
adopted. TRPA Ordinance 84-1. The temporary moratorium initiated by Resolution 83-21 thus ended up lasting approximately
eight months.82

On the day that TRPA Ordinance 84-1 was scheduled to take effect, implementation was enjoined at the behest of the State of California, which asserted that the new land-use controls were insufficiently stringent.83 That injunction remained in place until TRPA
adopted a revised plan in 1987, which prohibited construction on
sensitive lands in the Tahoe Basin.84
The Court’s decision did not address the constitutionality of
TRPA’s 1987 plan. Petitioners had attempted to amend their complaint to allege that adoption of the 1987 plan also constituted a takings, but the district court held that the claim was barred by both
California and Nevada’s statutes of limitations.85
In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist attributed the pre-1987
ban on development to TRPA, since “the District Court enjoined the
1984 Plan because the Plan did not comply with the environmental
requirements of respondent’s regulations and of the Compact itself.”86
The majority concluded that this “novel theory of causation was not
briefed, nor was it discussed during oral argument.”87 Furthermore,
the Court asserted that the petitioners did not raise the issue “presumably because they understood . . . we were only interested in the
narrow question decided today [, i.e., Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution
83-21].”88 Finally, the Court noted that petitioner’s 1991 amendment
to their complaint, challenging the 1987 plan as constituting a com-

80. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F.
Supp. 2d 1226, 1235 (D. Nev. 1999) (emphasis added), rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d
764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
81. Id. at 1235-36.
82. Id. at 1236 (citation ommited).
83. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312.
84. Id.
85. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1237.
86. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 345 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 314 n.8.
88. Id.
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pensable taking, was barred by the California and Nevada statutes of
limitations.89
While it might be reasonable to assume that the complexity of the
litigation delaying a challenge to the 1987 plan and dereliction of
TRPA in drafting its 1984 ordinance would constitute additional
grounds for the Court to adopt a fairness-based “taking as a whole”
approach, it merely concluded: “As the case comes to us, however, we
have no occasion to consider the validity of those provisions.”90 Some
ramifications of the Court’s decision to exclude many important issues from its consideration of the case are treated in connection with
the Court’s emphasis on fairness.91
C. The Supreme Court’s Narrow Holding
As Justice Stevens repeatedly emphasized, the Court’s six to three
holding was “narrow.” It simply refused to adopt a bright-line rule
that a temporary moratorium on development—even one depriving
the owner of all economic value of the land while it is in effect—is a
per se taking requiring payment of just compensation. Nothing in
this holding was inconsistent with the answer sought by Petitioners’
to their first certiorari question, which was that the Court reject the
notion that temporary moratoria were never compensable.
Although the opinion contained broad dicta commending the virtues of planning and the role of fairness in takings adjudication, Justice Stevens specified that the Court merely was rejecting the application of Lucas’s per se rule and reiterating the primacy of the “ad
hoc” test adopted in Penn Central. “[W]e do not hold that the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects
a taking[,]” he wrote, “we simply recognize that it should not be given
exclusive significance one way or the other.”92 Furthermore, Justice
Stevens added that “nothing that we say today qualifies [our First
English] holding.”93
Whatever Justice Stevens might have thought privately about the
matter, these reassurances probably were necessary to prevent Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, who are the swing votes on takings issues, from writing concurring opinions.
D. The Supreme Court’s Broad Dicta
While the holding in Tahoe-Sierra was narrow, the majority’s
dicta were quite extensive. The majority was greeted by supporters of
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 313 n.7.
Id. at 312.
See infra Part III.C.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337.
Id. at 328.
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land-use regulation as representing “a constitutional acceptance of
the need for planning in our society.”94 The Court’s “reticence about
establishing formulaic rules for deciding land use cases” and recognition of “the pervasive nature of land use policy in modern society”
were hailed as “significant victories for land use and environmental
planning supporters, and setbacks for property rights proponents.”95
“The Court’s opinion is, in short, a sweeping endorsement of the importance of comprehensive land use planning in areas, such as Lake
Tahoe, dominated by fragile ecosystems.”96
To be sure, victories in this passionately contested area of law are
savored.97 The fact that Tahoe-Sierra was the first clear-cut takings
victory for planners and environmentalists since Keystone Bituminous Coal,98 fifteen years earlier, undoubtedly added to the excitement. While this euphoria suggests that the Takings Clause has atrophied, wiser celebrants recognized that there is no reason to believe that Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have lost their basic commitment to protecting property rights.99
1. The Armstrong Principle and the Penn Central Polestar
Tahoe-Sierra celebrated and reinforced two basic doctrines of
regulatory takings jurisprudence. The first is the observation, in
Armstrong v. United States,100 that “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use without
just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”101 Tahoe-Sierra enshrined this dictum as the “Armstrong principle.”102 The second doctrine is the multifactor, ad hoc test of Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. City of New York.103

94. Bob Egelko, Property Owners Lose Key Tahoe Case, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 24,
2002, at A1 (quoting Robert Freilich, who filed an amicus brief for the American Planning
Association).
95. Harvey M. Jacobs, The Politics of Property Rights at the National Level: Signals
and Trends, 69:2 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 181, 186-87 (2003).
96. Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 ENVTL. L. 1, 14 (2003).
97. See Mark W. Cordes, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on Takings and Environmental Land Use Regulation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 337, 338 (2003) (summarizing
that “some initial responses to Palazzolo from the property rights movement have been
near ecstatic”).
98. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
99. See Lazarus, supra note 96, at 15 (observing that O’Connor and Kennedy merely
“concluded that per se rules sweep too broadly in this particular constitutional context”).
100. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
101. Id. at 49.
102. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002). The Court had never previously used this
phrase.
103. 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see infra Part III.B. and text accompanying note 149.
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Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island104 melded fairness and ad hoc review even more seamlessly, as
profusely quoted by Justice Stevens in Tahoe-Sierra:
In her concurring opinion in Palazzolo, Justice O’Connor reaffirmed this approach: “Our polestar instead remains the principles
set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern
partial regulatory takings. Under these cases, interference with
investment-backed expectations is one of a number of factors that
a court must examine.”105
More importantly, for reasons set out at some length by Justice
O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
we are persuaded that the better approach to claims that a regulation has effected a temporary taking “requires careful examination
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” In that opinion,
Justice O’Connor specifically considered the role that the “temporal relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisition” should play in the analysis of a takings claim.106

2. Decoupling Physical and Regulatory Takings
It was undisputed that the moratoria in Tahoe-Sierra deprived
the landowners of all economic beneficial use for the thirty-two
month period of the Court’s inquiry.107 The Court earlier held the
permanent physical occupation of private property to be compensable
in Loretto,108 the permanent deprivation of all economic use to be
compensable as the equivalent of a physical occupation in Lucas,109
and a temporal physical deprivation to be compensable in General
Motors.110 The only box in a type-of-deprivation by duration-ofdeprivation matrix not determined to constitute a per se taking was
the temporary deprivation of all economic use. The logical completion
of the matrix, as Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, was to treat the
temporary deprivation of economic use as a compensable “forced
leasehold.”111
The majority in Tahoe-Sierra set the stage for its contrary holding
by decoupling physical and regulatory takings. Justice Stevens, extrapolating from the “longstanding distinction between acquisitions
of property for public use . . . and regulations prohibiting private
uses,” created a superficially similar dichotomy that would preclude

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633).
Id. at 335 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636, 632).
Id. at 312 (noting that the ordinances “effectively prohibited all construction”).
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382 (1945).
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see infra note 184.
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“treat[ing] cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents
for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a ‘regulatory taking,’ and vice versa.”112
Furthermore, the Court made it clear that its holding in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council113 was limited to “the extraordinary
circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of
land is permitted.”114 The result, as described by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, is that “no categorical per se taking
rule applies to temporary moratoria on land development.”115
The combination of decoupling physical and regulatory takings
and insistence that the Lucas per se test applies only when literally
no remaining value is present has the practical effect of removing
Lucas as a factor in almost any planning moratorium that adversely
affects a fee interest.116
3. Disposing of First English
The Court had declared in First English that temporary takings
which “deny a landowner all use of his property are not different in
kind from permanent takings.”117 In his dissent in Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Thomas drew upon this point and Lucas to assert that “a regulation effecting a total deprivation of the use of a so-called ‘temporal
slice’ of property is compensable under the Takings Clause unless
background principles of state property law prevent it from being
deemed a taking.”118
The majority opinion essentially denied that the “not different in
kind” language possessed any significance. Justice Stevens simply
asserted that First English addressed the “remedial question of how
compensation is measured once a regulatory taking is established,”
but did not address “the quite different and logically prior question
whether the temporary regulation at issue had in fact constituted a
taking.”119 Judge Kozinski observed in his dissent from denial of en
banc review that the Ninth Circuit panel had adopted Justice Ste-

112. Id. at 323 (footnote omitted).
113. 505 U.S. 1003.
114. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017). The Court added
that this “emphasis on the word ‘no’ in the text” was “reiterated” by the Lucas footnote “explaining that the categorical rule would not apply if the diminution in value were 95% instead of 100%.” Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8).
115. Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
116. The Lucas per se test still seems viable with respect to moratoria applied against
leasehold interests. See infra Part IV.A.
117. First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
118. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1017).
119. Id. at 328.
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vens’s First English dissent without citing it.120 The observation
might be equally applicable to the Supreme Court, which “avoided
similarly overt references to the First English dissent, but the footprints are unmistakable.”121
4. Parcel as a Whole: The Temporal Dimension
Having uncoupled temporary deprivations of economic use from
Lucas and First English, Justice Stevens firmly hitched them to Justice William Brennan’s “parcel as a whole” concept in Penn Central.
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether
a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole—here, the city tax block designated as the “landmark
site.”122

Justice Stevens embraced Judge Reinhardt’s Ninth Circuit view
that a “planning regulation that prevents the development of a parcel
for a temporary period of time is conceptually no different than a
land-use restriction that permanently denies all use on a discrete
portion of property, or that permanently restricts a type of use across
all of the parcel.”123 He added that “a regulation that affects only a
portion of the parcel—whether limited by time, use, or space—does
not deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use.”124
5. Beneficial Use vs. Value
The Tahoe-Sierra majority opinion contains frequent references to
“value” as well as to “use.”125 One commentator has noted that the
Court “declined the landowners’ invitation to distinguish use from
value and, on that ground, to hold that the Lucas per se rule is triggered when all use is barred, even if some positive market value remains.”126 The question of use vs. value is important, in part, because
120. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V), 228
F.3d 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc).
121. Breemer, supra note 15, at 34.
122. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978)).
123. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency (TSPC IV), 216 F.3d 764, 776 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).
124. Id. at 318-19.
125. See id.
126. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 13. 127. See, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “A speculative market may exist in land that is regulated as well as in land that is not, and the precise content of regulations at any given time
may not be particularly important to those active in the market.” Id. at 1566.
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market value may be derived not from permissible uses under a
regulatory scheme, but perversely, because the regulatory scheme is
so Draconian as to lead reasonable investors to speculate on its revocation.127 In such a case, the parcel has value not under the use restriction but rather in contemplation of the removal of the use restriction.
In any event, Tahoe-Sierra does not reach this issue. The Court
wrote:
[A] permanent deprivation of the owner’s use of the entire area is a
taking of “the parcel as a whole,” whereas a temporary restriction
that merely causes a diminution in value is not. Logically, a fee
simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as
soon as the prohibition is lifted.128

The gravamen of this analysis is that value is not eliminated by
temporary restrictions because economic use is not eliminated. In
more standard economics terminology, the value inhering in the parcel subject to the moratorium is the present discounted value of the
anticipated future (post-moratorium) use of the parcel.
6. The Concept of Partial Regulatory Takings Reaffirmed
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted a decade ago: “Nothing in the language of the Fifth Amendment compels a
court to find a taking only when the Government divests the total
ownership of the property; the Fifth Amendment prohibits the uncompensated taking of private property without reference to the
owner’s remaining property interests.”129 The per se takings rule,
adopted for instances of total deprivation of economic enjoyment in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,130 was, as Tahoe-Sierra explains, “carved out” as an exception to the Penn Central multifactor
test.131
In spite of Lucas being the exception and Penn Central being the
general rule, some courts have opined that the absence of a total
wipeout of owner rights and value means that there has been no violation of the Takings Clause.132 The possibility that compensation
128. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332.
129. Fla. Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568.
130. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
131. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 325.
132. See, e.g., City of Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675, 684 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
plaintiff “did not establish that the ordinance deprived her of any reasonable use for which
[her] property is adapted and thus destroys its economic value, or all but a bare residue of
its value.”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted); cf. City of Glenn Heights v. Sheffield
Dev. Co., Inc., 61 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. App. 2001) (upholding a taking claim based on a thirtyeight percent diminution in value).
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would be due for a partial taking under Penn Central simply was dismissed.133
The Supreme Court intimated that partial takings indeed remain
compensable in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.134 Tahoe-Sierra subsequently made this point explicit after acknowledging that Armstrong
and Lucas involved total deprivations. “It is nevertheless perfectly
clear that Justice Black’s oft-quoted comment about the underlying
purpose of the guarantee that private property shall not be taken for
a public use without just compensation applies to partial takings as
well as total takings.”135 In Cienega Gardens v. United States,136 the
Federal Circuit held that regulations that resulted in the loss of
ninety-six percent in rate of return for a period of up to eight years
constituted a compensable taking. “The holding of Tahoe-Sierra,
thus, does not preclude recovery by plaintiffs who suffered less than
a total loss but who do argue for recovery under a Penn Central
analysis.”137
Some proponents of increased regulation have found the Court’s
unequivocal affirmance of the compensability of partial regulatory
takings to be “ominous.”138 Nevertheless, were compensation limited
to cases where there is a total deprivation of use, sophisticated regulators could circumvent the Fifth Amendment simply by leaving little
more than a token amount of beneficial enjoyment.
III. SOME COMMENTS ON “FAIRNESS”
A. “Fairness” and Property Rights in America
The Supreme Court’s association of property rights jurisprudence
with fairness is not new. Fifteen years before Armstrong v. United
States,139 the Court declared that just compensation law “undertakes
to redistribute certain economic losses inflicted by public improve-

133. See, e.g., Deupree v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp., 22 P.3d 773 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that an allegation of diminution in value, as opposed to complete deprivation of all
economically viable use, was insufficient to sustain a takings claim). In Covington v. Jefferson County, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected a taking claim where a decision to allow the
adjacent property to be utilized as a landfill reduced the plaintiff’s property values by
twenty-five percent. 53 P.3d 828 (Idaho 2002). The court held that where no physical invasion had occurred, Lucas was controlling and requires a complete and permanent deprivation of all economically viable use. Id. at 832.
134. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). “Our polestar . . . remains the principles set forth in Penn
Central itself and our other cases that govern partial regulatory takings.” Id. at 633.
135. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 332-33 n.27 (citing Lucas and Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1960)).
136. 331 F.3d 1319, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
137. Id. at 1345.
138. See John D. Echeverria, The Once and Future Penn Central Test, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG., June 2002, at 19, 21.
139. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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ments so that they will fall upon the public rather than wholly upon
those who happen to lie in the path of the project.”140 Indeed, “[t]he
constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness as it does from
technical concepts of property law.”141
It is not an exaggeration to say that the American republic was
founded largely upon an appreciation of the role of property as a cornerstone of individual liberty and of organized society.142 Property
was the great focus of the Framers.143 In every era since, the protection of property rights has gone hand-in-hand with the preservation
of liberty.144 What Tahoe-Sierra refers to as the “Armstrong principle”145 has its analogues in a number of other cases of recent decades.
Examples include: “[A] fundamental interdependence exists between
the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property”;146
“Individual freedom finds tangible expression in property rights.”147
“We see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or
Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances.”148
B. Penn Central as Defining Taxonomy
Given the centrality of the three-factor Penn Central test, it is
helpful to begin with the Supreme Court’s dispositive language:
While this Court has recognized that the “Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some
140. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945).
141. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973) (citing United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950)).
142. See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa.
1795).
[I]t is evident; that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having
it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men
have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects,
that induced them to unite in society. . . . The preservation of property then is a
primary object of the social compact.
Id; see also Steven J. Eagle, The Development of Property Rights in America and the Property Rights Movement, 1 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77 (2002).
143. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 92 (1990) (“The great focus of
the Framers was the security of basic rights, property in particular, not the implementation of political liberty.”).
144. See generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992).
145. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
321 (2002).
146. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
147. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993).
148. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994).
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people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole,” this Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” for determining when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to
pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely “upon
the particular circumstances [in that] case.”
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance. [1] The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, [2] the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is [3] the character of the
governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life
to promote the common good.149

The brackets numbering the tests are added since it is not immediately obvious that investment-backed expectations are anything
more than a subset of economic impact. The character of the governmental action test might attempt to separate out physical invasions
from all other types of regulations or attempt to distinguish one subset of permissible regulations from others.
In any event, the need to more readily characterize the physical
invasion as a taking lasted only for four years, until the Court ruled
in Loretto150 that “a permanent physical occupation is a government
action of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to
other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.”151 The emphasis
on investment-backed expectations apparently derives from a law review article in which Professor Frank Michelman intended to preclude compensation for speculators in land.152 His view was based on
“an argument that society may censure morally unacceptable behav-

149. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added) (alterations in first paragraph in original, alterations in second
paragraph added).
150. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
151. Id. at 432.
152. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). For elaboration,
see Steven J. Eagle, The Rise and Rise of “Investment-Backed Expectations”, 32 URB. LAW.
437, 437-40 (2000).

450

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:429

ior, and an argument that the taking clause need not recognize property losses discounted in land markets.”153
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court explains the test by quoting the language of Palazzolo: “The Penn Central analysis involves ‘a complex of
factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner,
the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.’”154 In elucidating this “complex of factors,” the California Supreme Court adopted a thirteen-factor test for regulatory takings in
Kavanau v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board.155 Its list comprised
the three Penn Central factors and an additional ten:
Subsequent cases, as well as a close reading of Penn Central, indicate other relevant factors: (1) whether the regulation “interfere[s]
with interests that [are] sufficiently bound up with the reasonable
expectations of the claimant to constitute ‘property’ for Fifth
Amendment purposes”; (2) whether the regulation affects the existing or traditional use of the property and thus interferes with
the property owner’s “primary expectation”; (3) “the nature of the
State’s interest in the regulation” . . . ; (4) whether the property
owner’s holding is limited to the specific interest the regulation abrogates or is broader; (5) whether the government is acquiring “resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions” such as
government’s “entrepreneurial operations”; (6) whether the regulation “permit[s the property owner] . . . to profit [and] . . . to obtain
a ‘reasonable return’ on . . . investment”; (7) whether the regulation provides the property owner benefits or rights that “mitigate
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed”; (8) whether the
regulation “prevent[s] the best use of [the] land”; (9) whether the
regulation “extinguish[es] a fundamental attribute of ownership”;
and (10) whether the government is demanding the property as a
condition for the granting of a permit.156

The California Supreme Court hastened to assure that this list is not
comprehensive, and the factors should be applied as appropriate
rather than used as a checklist.157
In addition to the Kavanau thirteen-factor test and the Penn Central three-factor test, Agins v. City of Tiburon158 contains a two-factor
153. Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 13 (1987).
154. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
315 n.10 (2002) (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)).
155. See 941 P.2d 851, 860 (Cal. 1997).
156. Id. at 860 (internal citations omitted).
157. Id.
158. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that the “application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land”) (citation omitted).
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test utilized in connection with facial takings claims. It might well be
that the most comprehensive test is the one-factor test given by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon—“if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking.”159 In short, once the Court
gave its broad imprimatur to comprehensive land-use regulation in
Euclid,160 taxonomies such as the three-factor test of Penn Central
serve largely to rationalize decisions based on judges’ unarticulated
(and perhaps unarticulable) preferences.
In her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,161 Justice
O’Connor protested that reasonable investment-backed expectations
should not be seen as “talismanic.”162 Nevertheless, she seemed to
equate fairness largely with conformance to reasonable landowner
expectations and with reasonable expectations to preacquisition notice of governmental regulations.163 This approach, which Justice
Stevens reached out to commend in Tahoe-Sierra,164 may in large
measure equate fairness with rules that are not ex post facto.165
While Justice Kennedy did not accept Justice Scalia’s equivalence
of complete deprivation of use with physical invasion in Lucas, his
concurrence in the judgment in that case expressed concern about
the very problem of lack of objective definitions that Scalia had addressed:
There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course; for if the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped
by what courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what courts say it is. Some circularity must be tolerated in these matters, however, as it is in other
spheres.166

159. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
160. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); cf. RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (advocating generally that constitutional regulation of property is limited to vindication of
neighbors’ property rights through application of principles such as nuisance, with
schemes of mutually advantageous regulation constituting takings with compensation in
kind).
161. 533 U.S. 606, 634 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id.
163. See id. at 634-36.
164. 535 U.S. at 327 n.23.
165. In her plurality opinion in Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), Justice
O’Connor declared that, when a legislative act “singles out certain employers to bear a
burden that is substantial in amount, based on the employers’ conduct far in the past, and
unrelated to any commitment that the employers made or to any injury they caused, the
governmental action implicates fundamental principles of fairness underlying the Takings
Clause.” Id. at 537.
166. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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A decade later, Professor Richard Lazarus noted qualms that
Penn Central is “unduly vague and ultimately incoherent.”167
Be that as it may, Tahoe-Sierra has now made clear that Penn
Central best expresses the Court’s own uncertainty about takings
analysis, and its ultimate conclusion that an analytical framework
that promotes case-by-case adjudication is more likely to lead to
sensible results than will any of the competing per se approaches
advocated by either property rights advocates or environmentalists.168

Obtaining sensible results might seem more like a legislative
quest than a judicial one, but the emphasis on fairness in the TahoeSierra dicta is suggestive that courts take on the role. Sensible results, however, flow from acts embodying both a specific intent to
improve the public condition and a general intent to do so within a
framework of the rule of law. As Justice Holmes reminded us, “a
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change.”169 By articulating the costs placed
upon them by prolonged planning and other development moratoria,
landowners in many cases may convince the courts that awarding
just compensation is sensible and fair.
C. Physical, Permanent, and Police Power Regulations
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides that Penn
Central’s multifactor analysis170 is not required in cases where there
has been a permanent physical deprivation of property,171 a temporary physical deprivation of property,172 or a permanent regulatory
deprivation of all economic use.173 A subsequent opinion by Justice
Stevens, in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,174 posits that
per se analysis is also “more consistent” when private property is
regulated to achieve a governmental benefit rather than to limit the
owner’s use of her property for police power purposes.175

167. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 13.
168. Id.
169. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
170. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
171. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (evaluating third-party installation of cable box and lines under government mandate); Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871) (discussing permanent flooding of private
land behind a public dam).
172. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (discussing government occupation for term of years).
173. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (evaluating a regulation
prohibiting permanent inhabitable structures).
174. 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003).
175. Id. at 1419.
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Tahoe-Sierra says that regulations which are regulatory, temporary, and promulgated to regulate land-use are subject to a Penn
Central multifactor analysis. As the Court explains:
Th[e] longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private
uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving
physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a
claim that there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa.
For the same reason that we do not ask whether a physical appropriation advances a substantial government interest or whether it
deprives the owner of all economically valuable use, we do not apply our precedent from the physical takings context to regulatory
takings claims. Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of
them impact property values in some tangential way—often in
completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings
would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford. By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.176

The distinctions between physical and regulatory deprivations,
permanent and temporary deprivations, and deprivations imposed to
regulate the owner’s use as opposed to imposed to achieve other government purposes all arise in Tahoe-Sierra and are important in
dealing with growth moratoria claims that will arise in the future.
1. Physical vs. Regulatory Deprivation
It is perhaps curious that Tahoe-Sierra, a case noted for advocacy
of balancing and nuance within a Penn Central framework, would
draw such a strident and bright-line distinction between taking by
physical occupation and taking by other displacements of landowner
prerogatives. The majority justifies this result by asserting the plain
meaning of the Fifth Amendment and by easily recognizable practical distinctions. Alas, however, the sharp distinctions look less clear
when viewed critically, and the cost of imagined clarity is the loss of
property rights—a more serious matter than the misidentification of
species by amateur ornithologists.
The Court says that:
In determining whether government action affecting property is
an unconstitutional deprivation of ownership rights under the Just
Compensation Clause, a court must interpret the word “taken.”
When the government condemns or physically appropriates the
property, the fact of a taking is typically obvious and undisputed.

176. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
323-24 (2002).
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When, however, the owner contends a taking has occurred because
a law or regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are
tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation, the predicate of a
taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more complex.177

In asserting that “[w]hen the government physically takes possession . . . it has a categorical duty to compensate,”178 the Court assumes that there are clear boundaries setting off the physical taking
from the regulatory taking. Alas, there are not. Physical appropriations may be “typically” obvious, but not always. Consider a series of
examples: the demolition of a private structure and erection of a fort;
the commandeering of a building for government workers;179 the
flooding of private land behind a government dam;180 the piloting of
loud aircraft low and directly over private land;181 the piloting of loud
aircraft low and just outside the property line; the digging of a government pollution monitoring well; the regular parking of government vehicles on private land; the parking of government vehicles
occasionally or episodically on private land; the accidental demolition
of a private building; and the government’s construction of a high
fence completely surrounding a private parcel.182 Is a bright-line selfevident, separating what is a physical taking from what is not?
The Court acknowledged in Tahoe-Sierra that it had required
compensation for the taking of leasehold interests, “even though that
use is temporary.”183 It also acknowledged Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
argument in dissent that a temporary prohibition on all use should
be treated as a per se taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.184 According to Rehnquist:
The Lucas rule is derived from the fact that a “total deprivation of
beneficial use is, from the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.” The regulation in Lucas was the
“practical equivalence” of a long-term physical appropriation, i.e., a
condemnation, so the Fifth Amendment required compensation.
The “practical equivalence,” from the landowner’s point of view, of

177. Id. at 322 n.17.
178. Id. at 322.
179. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
180. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
181. Compare, for example, Moore v. United States, 185 F. Supp. 399, 401 (N.D. Tex.
1960), and Freeman v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 541, 544-45 (W.D. Okla. 1958), both
holding that disturbance by low-flying aircraft not directly over the property did not sound
in tort, with Jackson v. Metropolitan Knoxville Airport Authority, 922 S.W.2d 860 (Tenn.
1996), holding that disturbance by low-flying aircraft not directly over property can constitute a taking.
182. See Stephen E. Abraham, Landgate—Taken But Not Used, 31 URB. LAW. 81, 95
(1999).
183. 535 U.S. at 322 (citing General Motors, 323 U.S. 373; United States v. Petty Motor
Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946)).
184. Id. at 324 n.19 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017).
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a “temporary” ban on all economic use is a forced leasehold. For
example, assume the following situation: Respondent is contemplating the creation of a National Park around Lake Tahoe to preserve its scenic beauty. Respondent decides to take a 6-year leasehold over petitioners’ property, during which any human activity
on the land would be prohibited, in order to prevent any further
destruction to the area while it was deciding whether to request
that the area be designated a National Park.185

Justice Stevens’s majority opinion countered this argument with
the assertion that condemnation of a leasehold would give the condemnor the right to use the property and to exclude others. “A regulatory taking, by contrast, does not give the government any right to
use the property, nor does it dispossess the owner or affect her right
to exclude others.”186 The problem, of course, is that there is no difference beyond intent between the leasehold for preservation of scenic beauty and the temporary prohibition on disturbance of scenic
beauty. Indeed, avoidance of the need to compensate owners through
the casting of regulations in terms of harm prevention, rather than
benefit creation, in large part led Justice Scalia to equate deprivation
of all economic use with physical occupation in Lucas.187
In addition to the distinctions noted already, physical invasions
might be both incidental and non-tortious, such as a seizure of contraband or instrumentalities or fruits of crimes. In that case, whatever recourse the owner might possess would be under the Fourth
Amendment.188 Also, there are physical aspects to the regulation of
intangible property, such as rights in the process of transmitting information. It is not clear whether rules involving such relationships,
such as those mandating connections to data networks, are physical
or regulatory for Takings Clause purposes.189
Tahoe-Sierra probably is correct, in some generalized sense, when
it asserts that the typical physical appropriation “usually represent[s] a greater affront to individual property rights.”190 But to say
that physical invasions usually are more severe than regulations or
for that matter, that physical invasions often could be distinguished
from tortious incursions, or that permanent restrictions usually are
more prolonged than temporary ones, hardly gives rise to confidence
in an arbitrary rule stating that physical and regulatory takings
claims are to be evaluated by different doctrines.

185. Id. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 324 n.19.
187. See 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12.
188. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
189. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 946-49 (2003).
190. 535 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added).
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2. Permanent vs. Temporary Deprivation
The durational element of a permanent physical occupation is not
necessarily to be taken literally. In Hendler v. United States,191 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that “[a]ll takings are
‘temporary,’ in the sense that the government can always change its
mind at a later time.”192 Later, in Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United
States,193 it explained that: “A ‘permanent’ physical occupation does
not necessarily mean a taking unlimited in duration. A ‘permanent’
taking can have a limited term. In Hendler, this court concluded that
the distinction between ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’ takings refers to
the nature of the intrusion, not its temporal duration.”194 Even here,
however, the court runs together duration and intensity when it
added that “[a] ‘permanent’ physical occupation, as distinguished
from a mere temporary trespass, involves a substantial physical interference with property rights.”195
In Tahoe-Sierra itself, TRPA first deprived the TSPC landowners
of all economically beneficial use of their property in 1981—over
twenty-two years ago. Given the posture in which the case reached
the Supreme Court, the majority would not consider that the prohibition on development certainly seems permanent. Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued in dissent that the Court consider a six-year period.196 The majority took into account only a thirty-two month period.197 Yet every one of these time periods, from longest to shortest,
exceeds by a substantial margin the two-year period that constituted
a permanent deprivation, which gave rise to the per se rule in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council.198
3. Deprivations to Regulate Use Versus Regulations to Achieve
Other Purposes
As was noted earlier, the decoupling of physical and regulatory
takings doctrine was an important element of Tahoe-Sierra:199
[The] longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private
uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving

191. 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
192. Id. at 1376.
193. 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
194. Id. at 1582 (citations omitted).
195. Id.
196. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
346-47 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 306.
198. Id. at 347 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
199. See supra Part II.D.2.
200. 535 U.S. at 323.
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physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a
claim that there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa.200

There is a significant defect with the logic of this sentence. The
Court here uses the term “acquisitions . . . for public use” in the sense
of physical acquisitions.201 However, regulations may be “for public
use” as well. The lack of a clear demarcation between regulations
that take private property for public use and those that regulate the
owner’s own use of the property was the point of Justice Scalia’s discussion in Lucas regarding the conceptual flaws of a jurisprudence
based on the difference between a conferral of benefit and a prevention of harm.202 Indeed, the ease by which all but “stupid” legislative
staff could dress benefit-conferring regulations to look like harmpreventing regulations203 led Justice Scalia’s quest for discerning the
more objective “restrictions that background principles of the State’s
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”204
The Supreme Court’s post-Tahoe-Sierra interest on lawyers’ trust
accounts (IOLTA) decision, Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,205 again brings up the key element of whether the regulation is
intended to regulate the owner, in his or her use of the property, or
whether it is intended for another unrelated purpose. Brown considered the Washington state IOLTA plan, which mandated that lawyers place in special accounts funds belonging to clients that are expected to generate so little interest as to make it impractical to
transmit that interest to the clients.206 Lawyers further are required
to transfer the accumulated interest in those accounts to legal services organizations designated by the court.207 The petitioners
claimed, under the doctrine that interest belongs to the owner of the
principal, that the interest constituted their property.208 In Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation,209 a case involving the similar Texas
IOLTA program, the Court held “that the interest income generated
by funds held in IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of the
owner of the principal.”210 Writing for the Court in Brown, Justice
Stevens “agree[d] that a per se approach is more consistent with the
reasoning in our Phillips opinion than Penn Central’s ad hoc analysis.”211
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
505 U.S. at 1024-26.
Id. at 1025 n.12.
Id. at 1029.
Brown, 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003).
See id. at 1413.
Id.
Id. at 1415.
524 U.S. 156 (1998).
Id. at 172.
Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1419.
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Brown ultimately upheld the IOLTA program on the ground that
the law clients suffered no pecuniary loss and that therefore there
was no violation of the Just Compensation Clause.212 Nevertheless,
Brown apparently stands for the proposition that the commandeering of an intangible asset to achieve a governmental purpose unrelated to that asset constitutes a taking, even when no pecuniary loss
results to its owner.
4. Consequentialist Arguments Favoring a Penn Central
Approach
While Justice Stevens’s Tahoe-Sierra opinion discussed theory, it
also asserted that refraining from imposing a per se test for planning
moratoria would have salutary consequences.
Unlike the “extraordinary circumstance” in which the government
deprives a property owner of all economic use, moratoria . . . are
used widely among land-use planners to preserve the status quo
while formulating a more permanent development strategy. In
fact, the consensus in the planning community appears to be that
moratoria, or “interim development controls” as they are often
called, are an essential tool of successful development.213

Appended to this observation, the Court quoted:
With the planning so protected, there is no need for hasty adoption
of permanent controls in order to avoid the establishment of nonconforming uses, or to respond in an ad hoc fashion to specific
problems. Instead, the planning and implementation process may
be permitted to run its full and natural course with widespread
citizen input and involvement, public debate, and full consideration of all issues and points of view.214

The full and natural course of planning undoubtedly has great
merit, especially in the esteem of professional planners. It also invokes the Progressive Era spirit of reform through the disinterested
application of professional expertise that was the driving force behind Euclid.215 But the neat notion that planning would establish a
harmonious community with no further need for change has long ago
faded. The everything-in-its-place homogeneity of Euclidean use
zones was famously exposed for its sterility by Jane Jacobs over forty
212. Id. at 1421. This is a highly contestable result. See Steven J. Eagle, Regulatory
Takings, Public Use, and Just Compensation After Brown, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10807 (2003).
213. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
337-38 (2002) (citations omitted).
214. Id. at 338 n.33 (emphasis added) (quoting Elizabeth A. Garvin & Martin L. Leitner, Drafting Interim Development Ordinances: Creating Time to Plan, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG., June 1996, at 3, 3).
215. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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years ago,216 and is now attacked by opponents of low density development as wasting natural resources by mandating “sprawl.”217
Planning and land development have an iterative relationship. Planning affects development, but development also affects planning.
Given the dynamic nature of our society, planning cannot be a onetime cure for disorderly development.
In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens feared that a rule making moratoria compensable would unduly discourage planning.218 In practice,
however, that is apt not to be true. As Stevens recognized, most
neighborhood zoning restrictions, such as mandatory setbacks of
building from the sidewalk, create a “reciprocity of advantage.”219
Landowners constrained by these types of regulations receive offsetting benefit from the imposition of the same restrictions on all their
neighbors, which explains consensual acceptance of the far more
stringent mutual restrictions imposed by homeowners’ associations.220 The taking serves as its own compensation.
The sound principle of reciprocity of advantage can be abused, of
course. Justice Stevens’s observation that “there is reason to believe
property values often will continue to increase despite a moratorium”221 is a prime example of the post hoc, prompter hoc fallacy. Almost certainly, most of the rise in prices of land in areas of rapid
growth is attributable to that growth itself, rather than faith that
planners will manage growth better than investors. Stevens cited one
case “noting that land values could be expected to increase 20% dur-

216. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (Vintage Books
1992) (1961).
217. The literature is extensive. See, e.g., Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The
Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 137, 140 (1999) (noting that “Euclidean zoning of segregated land uses and the
emergence of the automobile began to establish the first distant ‘suburbs’ throughout the
United States”); Francesca Ortiz, Biodiversity, the City, and Sprawl, 82 B.U. L. REV. 145,
179 (2002) (stating “traditional Euclidean zoning encourages sprawl by separating different land uses according to intensity of use; thus, a city subject to this type of zoning will
generally have different areas set aside for single-family residential uses, multiple-family
residential uses, commercial uses, and industrial uses”); Patricia E. Salkin, From Euclid to
Growing Smart: The Transformation of the American Local Land Use Ethic into Local
Land Use and Environmental Controls, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 118 (2002) (asserting
that “smart growth legislation advocates local flexibility and promotes mixed-use development, in contrast to Euclidean zoning that promotes a more rigid separation of uses”).
218. 535 U.S. at 339 (asserting that adopting a per se rule would impose severe costs
on planning deliberations and “may force officials to rush through the planning process or
to abandon the practice altogether”).
219. See id. at 324 n.19.
220. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994);
Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and “Reasonableness” in Private Law: The Special
Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 49-50 (1990) (advocating judicial deference to private decision making in residential communities).
221. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341.
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ing a 5-year moratorium on development.”222 If planning moratoria
truly have such wondrous effects, “why not sign up for a 10-year
moratorium and glean a 40 percent return?”223 Furthermore, most
proper regulations that have an unreasonable impact on isolated
landowners are ripe candidates for variances224 or entail losses of
such modest amounts as to make recourse to litigation exceedingly
unlikely.
D. From Parcel as a Whole to Takings as a Whole
1. A Broader View of Parcel as a Whole
As discussed earlier,225 Justice Stevens’s Tahoe-Sierra opinion enthusiastically reiterated the doctrine developed by Justice Brennan
in Penn Central that the Court must view regulatory takings claims
in the context of the aggregate of the landowner’s rights—“the parcel
as a whole.”226 Yet, quite anomalously, Tahoe-Sierra did not deal with
the whole of the issues fairly raised by the case. As Richard Lazarus
noted in celebration of the Tahoe-Sierra decision, “[T]he narrowness
of the slice of that litigation and the background facts before the
Court in Tahoe-Sierra may well have played a significant role in securing an outcome favorable to the government.”227
Justice Brennan’s invocation of “parcel as a whole” gave no provenance for the term. Although he grounded the term in takings jurisprudence,228 the Court’s existing doctrine had required condemnation
for partial takings.229 Rather, the “parcel as a whole” doctrine arose
because the need for determination of the relevant parcel was implicit and unavoidable given the Court’s takings jurisprudence. In
Keystone Bituminous Coal,230 Justice Stevens stated for the majority
that
[b]ecause our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the
value that has been taken from the property with the value that
222. Id. (describing Growth Props., Inc. v. Klingbeil Holding Co., 419 F. Supp. 212, 218
(D. Md. 1976)).
223. John J. Delaney, Tahoe-Sierra: The Great Terrain Robbery, or Simply a Bridge
Too Far for Landowners?, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 2002, at 15, 16.
224. Variances are authorized departures from zoning requirements “where, owing to
special conditions, a literal enforcement . . . will result in unnecessary hardship.” A
STANDARD ZONING ENABLING ACT § 7 (U.S. Dep’t Commerce, rev. ed. 1926).
225. See supra Part II.D.4.
226. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326-27 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31).
227. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 4.
228. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
229. See, e.g., United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180, 185-86 (1911) (awarding severance damages to the untaken remainder of plaintiff’s land in an inverse condemnation action).
230. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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remains in the property, one of the critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property “whose value is to furnish
the denominator of the fraction.”231

The opposite position, presented in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Keystone, is that a taking occurs whenever “the government
by regulation extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable segment of property.”232 The doctrine of “parcel as a whole” responds to the relevant parcel problem by maximizing the size of the
relevant parcel.
While Justice Stevens maintained that the Court has “consistently rejected” approaches that would sever a parcel,233 Justice
Thomas asserted in dissent that the “majority’s decision to embrace
the ‘parcel as a whole’ doctrine as settled is puzzling.”234 He quoted
from Lucas,235 which had questioned the rule, and from Palazzolo,236
which only a year prior to Tahoe-Sierra seemed to invite its reconsideration.
The parcel as a whole rule finds its justification in preventing selfserving landowners from engaging in “conceptual severance” by defining the affected property right as exactly coextensive with the
regulatory deprivation, thus always resulting in a total deprivation.237 However, there are several problems with this approach. One
is determining when the deprivation of a stick from the property’s
bundle of sticks is determinative and when it is not.238 Another problem is that terms such as “parcel as a whole” and “conceptual severance” imply that there is the full parcel to start with and that ma231. Id. at 497 (quoting Michelman, supra note 152, at 1192).
232. Id. at 517 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
233. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
331 (2002).
234. Id. at 355 n.* (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
235. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 n.7 (1992) (“recognizing that ‘uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in [the Court’s] “deprivation” fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court,’ and that the
relevant calculus is a ‘difficult question’”) (alteration in original).
236. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631) (“noting that the
Court has ‘at times expressed discomfort with the logic of [the parcel as a whole] rule’”) (alteration in original).
237. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1988) (“[E]very regulation of
any portion of an owner’s ‘bundle of sticks,’ is a taking of the whole of that particular portion considered separately. Price regulations ‘take’ that particular servitude curtailing free
alienability, building restrictions ‘take’ a particular negative easement curtailing control
over development, and so on.”) (footnote omitted).
238. Compare, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing
“the right to exclude others” as one of the “most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property”), with PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (“[H]ere appellants have failed to demonstrate that the ‘right to exclude
others’ is so essential to the use or economic value of their property that the stateauthorized limitation of it amounted to a ‘taking.’”).
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nipulation can redound only to the landowner’s favor. But clearly
some definitions of property are too broad,239 reflecting manipulation
in the government’s favor. I have termed such manipulation for the
purpose of enlarging the relevant parcel “conceptual agglomeration.”240
Although neither the landowner nor the state can be trusted to
provide a definition free from self-interest, an objective test grounded
in economic viability can lead to effective scrutiny of the landowner’s
asserted interest.241 Alternatively, the landowner could satisfy an objectivity requirement by showing that the asserted property interest
taken constitutes a “commercial unit” that is traded in the vicinity.242
By insisting on “parcel as a whole,” the Court is adhering to a doctrine bereft of the flexibility that market or similar forces might provide. This does not mean that cases under “parcel as a whole” determine that the relevant parcel always is the extent of land received
under the deed that includes the area where the regulation purportedly works a taking. To the contrary, the area might be smaller, especially where the landowner can demonstrate that part of the land
was sold off long before the regulation at issue was promulgated.243 It
might also be larger when other lands in the vicinity belonging to the
owner have related uses.244 As Judge Jay Plager of the U.S. Court of
239. A classic illustration is the finding by the New York Court of Appeals that the
relevant parcel encompassing Grand Central Terminal should include “plaintiffs’ heavy
real estate holdings in the Grand Central area, including hotels and office buildings.” Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (N.Y. 1977). The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently deemed the relevant parcel to be the city tax block on which the
terminal was located. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31
(1978). Later, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), the Court
deemed what it termed the New York Court of Appeals’ approach of including the “total
value of the taking claimant’s other holdings in the vicinity” to be an “extreme—and we
think, unsupportable—view of the relevant calculus.” Id. at 1016 n.7.
240. STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 11-7(b)(2), at 789 (2d ed. 2001); see also
John E. Fee, Of Parcels and Property, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES 101, 104-06 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002).
241. See John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking
Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1537 (1994) (proposing that “a taking has occurred when
any horizontally definable parcel, containing at least one economically viable use independent of the immediately surrounding land segments, loses all economic use due to government regulation”).
242. See EAGLE, supra note 240, § 11-7(e)(5), at 813-14. (analogizing commercial unit of
real property to the commercial unit of goods under U.C.C. § 2-105(6) (2002)).
243. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
244. See, e.g., Forest Props., Inc. v. United States, 177 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
“Where the developer treats legally separate parcels as a single economic unit, together
they may constitute the relevant parcel.” Id. at 1365.
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit put it, “Our precedent displays a
flexible approach, designed to account for factual nuances.”245
In spite of the difficulties in determining what is the relevant parcel under the “parcel as a whole” approach, Tahoe-Sierra seems to
commit the Court to that framework. The tradeoff, presumably, is
that the facially rigid, but in fact more subjective, test allows greater
room for fairness considerations.
2. Fairness Requires Consideration of the Taking as a Whole
If fairness requires “that ‘the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety’”246 when examining the denominator of the takings fraction,247
it should require a similar aggregation of restrictions constituting
the numerator. Just as parcel as a whole focuses on the aggregate of
the landowners benefit from ownership, taking as a whole similarly
would focus on the aggregate of the landowner’s deprivation from
regulation of the parcel.248
The stark fact is that the TSPC landowners likely lost their case
before it was briefed and argued.
The government won Tahoe-Sierra because of the narrowness of
the legal issue considered by the Court: whether TRPA’s 32-month
moratorium on development amounted to a per se Lucas taking in
a facial challenge. Entirely removed from the judicial equation
were factors that could have depicted the petitioner landowners’
claims in a more sympathetic and legally defensible light. In their
stead was a legal issue that effectively compelled the petitioners to
propound a legal theory that had virtually no chance of prevailing
before the Court, which is why the petitioners’ briefs on the merits
repeatedly sought to rewrite the question presented before the
Court.249

As noted earlier, the Court was adamant in considering the landowners’ deprivation of all economically viable use of their land only
in the context of the land’s use for the entire future after the moratoria terminated.250 On the other hand, the Court simply has not taken

245. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
246. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
327 (2002) (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (holding that prohibition on
commercial transactions in eagle feathers did not bar other uses or impose physical invasion or restraint and was not a taking)).
247. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
248. The numerator of the takings fraction is the property owner’s loss rather than the
regulator’s gain, since as Justice Stevens recently reiterated, that is the Constitutional
standard. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1419 (2003). “‘[T]he question is
what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained.’” Id. (quoting Boston Chamber of
Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
249. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 17.
250. See supra Part II.B.2.
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into account that many of the Tahoe-Sierra landowners were first
precluded from all economically beneficial use of their land in 1981
and that they have remained unable to build the homes they had
planned or to make other use of their property for twenty-two uninterrupted years.251 Likewise, it was clear at the outset that preventing the eutrophication of Lake Tahoe would require severe restrictions in “sensitive environmental zones” along streams for an indefinite period.252
Justice Stevens acknowledged for the majority that “[t]he ‘rolling
moratoria’ theory [i.e., the continuity of deprivation] was presented
in the petition for certiorari, but our order granting review did not
encompass that issue.”253 He also explained that “the case was tried in
the district court and reviewed in the Court of Appeals on the theory
that each of the two moratoria was a separate taking, one for a 2
year period and the other for an 8 month period.”254
It is instructive to juxtapose Justice Stevens’s response to the fact
that the grant of certiorari did not encompass the last eighteen or
nineteen years of the twenty-two year deprivation on use, with his
action, one year later, in the Court’s most recent property rights case,
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.255 Brown, as previously
noted, involved a rule imposed by the Supreme Court of Washington
requiring that client trust funds that were not of sufficient size or
duration to generate net interest if placed in separate accounts for
the individual clients be deposited in an interest on lawyers trust accounts (IOLTA) account for the benefit of legal services programs
designated by the state court.256 The issues decided below and briefed
and argued in the U.S. Supreme Court were whether the mandatory
deposit of client funds into the IOLTA account or the disbursement of
the interest on those funds to the legal services programs constituted
compensable takings.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, declared:
While it confirms the state’s authority to confiscate private property, the text of the Fifth Amendment imposes two conditions on

251. See Michael M. Berger, The Shame of Planners, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June
2002, at 6, 7 (noting that the freeze on development contained in TRPA’s 1981, 1984, and
1987 plans “continues to prohibit the use of virtually all of the lots that were involved in
the Tahoe-Sierra litigation”).
252. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308-09; infra text accompanying notes 376-78.
253. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added) (citing the Court’s grant of certiorari, 533 U.S. 948 (2001)).
254. Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC
IV), 216 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)). Should the Court have
considered the totality of what is currently a twenty-two year moratorium? Of course, the
Court could have remanded with directions that the court of appeals consider that issue.
255. 123 S. Ct. 1406 (2003).
256. See supra text accompanying notes 205-12.
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the exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a “public use”
and “just compensation” must be paid to the owner. In this case,
the first condition is unquestionably satisfied. If the State had imposed a special tax, or perhaps a system of user fees, to generate
the funds to finance the legal services supported by the Foundation, there would be no question as to the legitimacy of the use of
the public’s money.257

Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that these “ruminations . . .
come as a surprise, inasmuch as they address a nonjurisdictional
constitutional issue raised by neither the parties nor their amici.”258
TSPC’s attorney subsequently made the same point, albeit more colorfully:
“Ponder this: the same Justice Stevens who couldn’t think of a way
to deal with the rolling moratoria issue in Tahoe-Sierra because
they hadn’t granted cert on that issue had no trouble dealing with
the public use issue in Brown when nobody raised the issue at all.
Curiouser and curiouser.”259

From the perspective of a traditional and prudential court, the
discordance should have been resolved by forbearance in Brown from
raising nonjurisdictional issues not briefed and argued. The public
use issue also contributed nothing to shape the outcome. On the
other hand, were the Court in Tahoe-Sierra to have confronted the
fact that landowners of modest means have been deprived of all use
of their property for an aggregate period of twenty-two years and
running, its view of the nature of interim moratoria, its focus on fairness, and the “seven theories” it enunciated should have been profoundly affected.260
3. Highly-Segmented Takings
It is so commonplace as to appear unremarkable that eminent
domain actions often are directed against small slivers of property.
Typically, the condemnor will acquire only a physical part of the
owner’s parcel, a practice that has become familiar in part because of
the acquisition of strips of rural land for highway expansion.261 A
sometimes more problematic example involves the condemnee that
257. Brown, 123 S. Ct. at 1417 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
258. Id. at 1422 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
259. Dwight H. Merriam, Panning for Gold in the Trickle of Supreme Court Cases This
Term: What Can We Learn from the IOLTA and Referendum Cases?, ZONING & PLAN. L.
REP., June 2003, at 1, 6 (quoting Michael M. Berger).
260. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the seven theories.
261. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 110, 121 (2002) (observing that “[m]any (perhaps most) condemnations are
partial takings; that is, the taker acquires only a fraction of the owner’s property and
leaves the balance in the owner’s hands. This will often occur, for example, when the taking is for a highway or a utility right-of-way”).
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intends to acquire a larger set of rights, has been successful in negotiating purchases from the other owners, and utilizes eminent domain to acquire the interest of the holdout.262
An anti-segmentation rule applies to the partial condemnation of
parcels. The condemnor must pay severance damages for injury to
that part of the parcel not condemned.263 The Supreme Court applied
this principle to a temporary taking, which involved the condemnation of a leasehold interest in a building, in United States v. General
Motors Corp.264 The condemnation was a short-term leasehold in the
middle of the condemnee’s long-term leasehold. Just compensation
was held to include severance damages to that part of the owner’s interest not taken:
If the Government need only pay the long-term rental of an
empty building for a temporary taking from the long-term tenant a
way will have been found to defeat the Fifth Amendment’s mandate for just compensation in all condemnations except those in
which the contemplated public use requires the taking of the fee
simple title. In any case where the Government may need private
property, it can devise its condemnation so as to specify a term of a
day, a month, or a year, with optional contingent renewal for indefinite periods, and with the certainty that it need pay the owner
only the long-term rental rate of an unoccupied building for the
short term period, if the premises are already under lease or, if
not, then a market rental for whatever minimum term it may
choose to select, fixed according to the usual modes of arriving at
rental rates. And this, though the owner may be damaged by the
ouster ten, a score, or perhaps a hundred times the amount found
due him as “fair rental value.” Whatever of property the citizen
has the Government may take. When it takes the property . . .
terminating altogether his interest, under the established law it
must pay him for what is taken, not more; and he must stand
whatever indirect or remote injuries are properly comprehended
within the meaning of “consequential damage” as that conception
has been defined in such cases. . . .
It is altogether another matter when the Government does not
take his entire interest, but by the form of its proceeding chops it
into bits, of which it takes only what it wants, however few or
minute, and leaves him holding the remainder, which may then be
altogether useless to him, refusing to pay more than the “market
rental value” for the use of the chips so cut off. This is neither the
“taking” nor the “just compensation” the Fifth Amendment con-

262. See, e.g., County of Sussex v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 796 A.2d
958 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (holding that county originally planning condemnation
of a building could settle with the owner and other tenants and condemn the lease of a single nonconsenting tenant only), aff’d, 796 A.2d 913 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
263. See, e.g., State v. Pahl, 95 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn. 1959).
264. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
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templates. The value of such an occupancy is to be ascertained, not
by treating what is taken as an empty warehouse to be leased for a
long term, but what would be the market rental value of such a
building on a lease by the long-term tenant to the temporary occupier.265

According to Tahoe-Sierra, General Motors is, perhaps, not on
point, since different rules apply to regulatory takings than to physical takings.266 Nonetheless, it is difficult to square the application of
Tahoe-Sierra’s fairness-based jurisprudence to the denominator of
the takings fraction while permitting abusive segmentation with respect to the numerator.
Another example of deprivation of severance damages is the
North Carolina Supreme Court’s recent decision in Department of
Transportation v. Rowe.267 Traditionally, severance damages with respect to the remainder of a parcel partially condemned have been offset by the “special benefits” that will rebound to the owner of the parcel from the project for which the condemnation is undertaken.268 In
Rowe, the court extended this offset to “general benefits” received by
the owner as well.269 This means that severance damages are reduced
for benefits received from the condemnation project, even though the
condemnees received no greater general benefits than others in the
vicinity who suffered no condemnation at all. Also, the landowner
subjected to the condemnation probably contributed to the cost of the
project through taxation, thus conferring general benefit upon the
community.
E. Cumulative Actions of Multiple Government Entities
Another issue related to fairness is whether the deprivation of
property should be treated differently for takings purposes if it results from the actions of one governmental entity or from the actions
of two or more government entities. In Ciampetti v. United States,270
the owner’s lands, constituting a collection of 573 lots, were subject to
federal and state wetland regulations applicable to irregularlybounded and not entirely coextensive areas.271 The owner’s state takings claim was rejected on the grounds that there was federal pre-

265. Id. at 381-82.
266. See supra Part II.D.2.
267. 549 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1130 (2002).
268. See 3 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 8A.02 (Julius L. Sackman ed., rev. 3d ed.
2003) (concluding that “most jurisdictions agree that only ‘special’ benefits may be offset
against severance damages and neither special benefits nor general benefits may be offset
against the part taken”).
269. Rowe, 549 S.E.2d at 209.
270. 18 Cl. Ct. 548 (Cl. Ct. 1989).
271. Id. at 550.
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emption.272 The claims court subsequently rejected the Federal Government’s assertion that the denial of state permits was the basis of
the federal denial because the Army Corps of Engineers had made an
independent merit-based determination under federal clean water
regulations.273 In effect, the claims court rejected an attempt to deflect responsibility to a state for what it determined to be a federal
deprivation.
In Lost Tree Village Corp. v. City of Vero Beach,274 an owner of island property brought an inverse condemnation action against a
town with regulations precluding development unless there was a
bridge and against a city with regulations precluding construction of
the bridge.275 The court reversed dismissal of the developer’s suit,
quoting from Ciampetti276 and concluding: “Both Constitutional provisions emphasize the taking of the property, not the governmental
unit responsible for the taking.”277 In a sense, both Ciampetti and
Lost Tree Village mirror the result that occurs when a condemnor
wishes to acquire a fee simple in land upon which multiple parties
have ownership interests. The condemnor pays the fair market value
of the fee simple, and the private claimants must provide or litigate
how the proceeds are to be allocated.278
F. Fairness Requires Consideration of Who Will Bear the Burden
As noted earlier, the landowners represented by TSPC had modest lots in existing and largely developed subdivisions in the hills
above Lake Tahoe.279 While extremely expensive and large homes
have been built on the lakeshore,280 and resort districts catering to
numerous tourists are thriving,281 the TSPC owners have been bereft

272. Id. at 556.
273. Id. at 555-56.
274. 838 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
275. Id. at 565.
276. Id. at 568 (quoting Ciampetti, 18 Cl. Ct. at 556).
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Redevelopment Agency of Fresno v. Penzner, 87 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Ct. App.
1970).
279. See supra Part II.A.2.
280. See, e.g., Tom Gorman, The Nation Along Lake Tahoe, Planning for a Throwback
to the 1980s Officials Say Building of Luxurious Homes on Waterfront Is Out of Control.
Some Disagree., L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at A20 (noting that “luxurious waterfront
building has gone overboard,” and that at Incline Village, “half-acre lots with 100 feet of
shoreline frontage are worth $3 million; a five-acre lot with 200 feet of lake frontage is valued upward of $20 million”).
281. See, e.g., Jim Carlton, Tahoe Aims for Change: From Seedy to Sleek, WALL ST. J.,
May 7, 2003, at B1 (reporting that the “bustling south shore of Lake Tahoe, unlike the
more open and upscale north-shore area, is undergoing an estimated $500 million makeover to replace most of its 1950s and 1960s-era budget motels with sleeker, more environment[ally-]friendly buildings”).
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of all use and enjoyment of their land since 1981.282 These considerations led the petitioners in Tahoe-Sierra to pose the following certiorari question, which the Court did not accept:
3. Can a land use regulatory agency purport to “protect the environment” at a major regional location (here, Lake Tahoe) by compelling a selected group of individual landowners to forego all use
of their individual homesites, and thereby compel a de facto donation of their land for public use without compensation?283

While Justice Stevens’s majority opinion did not comment on this
issue as such, it contained an explanation that touched upon it:
[W]ith a temporary ban on development there is a lesser risk that
individual landowners will be “singled out” to bear a special burden that should be shared by the public as a whole. At least with a
moratorium there is a clear “reciprocity of advantage,” because it
protects the interests of all affected landowners against immediate
construction that might be inconsistent with the provisions of the
plan that is ultimately adopted. “While each of us is burdened
somewhat by such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from
the restrictions that are placed on others.” In fact, there is reason
to believe property values often will continue to increase despite a
moratorium. Such an increase makes sense in this context because
property values throughout the Basin can be expected to reflect
the added assurance that Lake Tahoe will remain in its pristine
state.284

The notion of “reciprocity of advantage,” which the Court borrows
from Justice Holmes,285 works so long as the category of landowners
burdened by the restrictions individually is coextensive with the
category of landowners and citizens who are benefited. There have
been times when the Supreme Court has applied this concept accurately286 and times when it has not.287 In Tahoe-Sierra, however, it is
282. Kanner, supra note 42.
283. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167)
(emphasis in original).
284. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (citations omitted).
285. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
286. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding the New Orleans Vieux Carre planning regulations and finding “abundantly clear
that the amended ordinance . . . is solely an economic regulation aimed at enhancing the
vital role of the French Quarter’s tourist-oriented charm in the economy of New Orleans).
287. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138-39 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist took notice that:
Of the over one million buildings and structures in the city of New York, appellees have singled out 400 for designation as official landmarks. The owner of
a building might initially be pleased that his property has been chosen by a distinguished committee of architects, historians, and city planners for such a singular distinction. But he may well discover . . . that the landmark designation
imposes upon him a substantial cost, with little or no offsetting benefit except
for the honor of the designation.
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clear that the beneficiaries of the planning moratoria are the wealthier shoreline landowners, the merchants who derive significant value
from tourism, and the people throughout the nation and beyond who
derive “existence value” from knowing that the Tahoe Basin is preserved.288
IV. SEVEN THEORIES FOR CHALLENGING UNREASONABLE PLANNING
MORATORIA
For most attorneys, the study of leading Supreme Court cases is
retrospective in nature but prospective in purpose. The object is to
assist clients to conform future conduct to the law, to settle ambiguities in their clients’ favor, and to resolve interstitial questions in
their clients’ interest. In Tahoe-Sierra, the practical and procedural
constraints that prevented the landowners’ case from being fully explored in the Supreme Court have been noted. In future controversies involving planning moratoria, such constraints might be
avoided, and Tahoe-Sierra provides a roadmap in the form of its articulated “seven theories” of how landowners might prevail.289
Tahoe-Sierra rejected the argument that Lucas, First English, and
the Court’s other regulatory takings cases compel the use of a per se
test for planning moratoria.290 It raised up the Armstrong fairness
principle291 and reiterated the need for utilizing the “fact specific” inquiry that Penn Central mandates.292 The Court’s “seven theories”
dialogue indicates its recognition of the need to curtail abusive
growth moratoria, to make clear that fairness is the touchstone in
this effort, and to create a taxonomy for categorizing Penn Central
challenges to specific development moratoria.
Before parsing the individual provisions, it is instructive to view
Justice Stevens’s seven theories as a whole:
Considerations of “fairness and justice” arguably could support
the conclusion that TRPA’s moratoria were takings of petitioners’
property based on any of seven different theories. First, even

Id. (footnote omitted).
288. “Existence value” is the value individuals place upon the continued existence of a
resource apart from the value of its use. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Consorting with
Forests: Rethinking Our Relationship to Natural Resources and How We Should Value
Their Loss, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 677, 1680 (1995) (asserting harm “when humans destroy
natural resources involving damage to a subjective, emotional connection that many people
feel toward the environment”). But see Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765, 767 (1999) (asserting that the concept of existence
value is conceptually flawed).
289. 535 U.S. at 333-34.
290. Id. at 332 (asserting that “the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the ‘extraordinary case’ in which a regulation permanently deprives property of all value”).
291. Id. (quoting Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49).
292. Id.
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though we have not previously done so, we might now announce a
categorical rule that, in the interest of fairness and justice, compensation is required whenever government temporarily deprives
an owner of all economically viable use of her property. Second, we
could craft a narrower rule that would cover all temporary landuse restrictions except those “normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like”
which were put to one side in our opinion in First English. Third,
we could adopt a rule like the one suggested by an amicus supporting petitioners that would “allow a short fixed period for deliberations to take place without compensation—say maximum one
year—after which the just compensation requirements” would
“kick in.” Fourth, with the benefit of hindsight, we might characterize the successive actions of TRPA as a “series of rolling moratoria” that were the functional equivalent of a permanent taking.
Fifth, were it not for the findings of the District Court that TRPA
acted diligently and in good faith, we might have concluded that
the agency was stalling in order to avoid promulgating the environmental threshold carrying capacities and regional plan mandated by the 1980 Compact. Sixth, apart from the District Court’s
finding that TRPA’s actions represented a proportional response to
a serious risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might have argued
that the moratoria did not substantially advance a legitimate state
interest. Finally, if petitioners had challenged the application of
the moratoria to their individual parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some of them might have prevailed under a Penn
Central analysis.293

A. Equating Temporary Moratoria to Temporary Physical Takings
[E]ven though we have not previously done so, we might now announce a categorical rule that, in the interest of fairness and justice, compensation is required whenever government temporarily
deprives an owner of all economically viable use of her property.294

Conceptually, the establishment of a rule that development moratoria are takings per se would put regulatory takings on the same
footing as physical appropriations of land, which have long been held
compensable, regardless of whether the appropriations are permanent or temporary.295 After Tahoe-Sierra, this approach appears to be
dead.

293. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333-34 (citations and footnotes omitted).
294. Id. at 333.
295. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (holding temporary occupancy of an office building by government employees is a compensable taking);
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, 181 (1871) (holding permanent flooding
of private land upstream from a public dam is a compensable taking).
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Justice Stevens supported Tahoe-Sierra’s result by citing practical
concerns about the hindrance of various public functions that such a
rule would entail. Some are mundane (“normal delays in obtaining
building permits”),296 and others are perhaps more quixotic (“orders
temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that violate health codes, fire-damaged buildings”).297 Perhaps most important, Stevens added that a strict per se rule would make “routine
government processes prohibitively expensive.”298
These practical reasons being disposed of, the Court rehearsed its
“Penn Central as polestar”299 approach:
More importantly, for reasons set out at some length by Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
we are persuaded that the better approach to claims that a regulation has effected a temporary taking “requires careful examination
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.” In that opinion,
Justice O’Connor specifically considered the role that the “temporal relationship between regulatory enactment and title acquisition” should play in the analysis of a takings claim.300

In fact, a strict per se approach to regulatory takings is inconsistent with any theory of land-use regulation beyond nuisance abatement.301 The Court clearly was not ready to entertain such an approach, and this first theory is a straw man serving as an admonishment that the Court supports planning and that per se arguments
to the contrary will be rejected.
There is, however, one important caveat: Tahoe-Sierra carefully
limits its application of the “parcel as a whole” rule to temporal segmentation only with respect to fee simple ownership. The majority
declared that an “interest in real property is defined by the metes
and bounds that describe its geographic dimensions and the term of
years that describes the temporal aspects of the owner’s interest.”302
Concomitantly, “a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by
a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the property will
recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.”303 A lesser term
than a fee simple might be rendered valueless because it might terminate before the planning moratorium is set to expire. This might
296. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334-35 (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)).
297. Id. at 335.
298. Id.
299. See supra Part II.D.1.
300. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
632, 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis omitted).
301. Compare id., with EPSTEIN, supra note 160 (advocating a strict per se approach to
regulatory takings).
302. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32.
303. Id. at 332.
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result in a complete deprivation of value and a per se taking under
Lucas.304 Even if the moratorium would (or might) expire first, the
owner’s subsequent beneficial use of the parcel might be for only a
short time. The upshot of this is that the shorter the duration of the
owner’s estate, the more likely it would be that the moratorium
would be deemed a Penn Central taking.305
B. Moratoria in Excess of Normal Delays
[W]e could craft a narrower rule that would cover all temporary
land-use restrictions except those “normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the
like” which were put to one side in our opinion in First English.306

Given the infeasibility of a strict rule denominating development
moratoria as takings,307 a categorical rule tempered by notions of reasonableness might protect private property rights while at the same
time allowing for permissible governmental review of land development. “Normal delays,” the term used in First English to describe a
possible exception to the Court’s holding that compensation is the
appropriate remedy for a temporary taking, seems well suited to this
task.308
The Court concedes that a “narrower rule that excluded the normal delays associated with processing permits . . . would certainly
have a less severe impact on prevailing practices.”309 Contravening
this, it adds that a narrower rule “would still impose serious financial constraints on the planning process,” which is important, since
moratoria like those in Tahoe-Sierra are widely used and such interim growth controls “are an essential tool of successful development.”310
Given the Court’s recent aversion to bright-line rules regarding
regulatory takings evidenced in Palazzolo311 and Tahoe-Sierra, it is

304. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
305. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
306. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987)).
307. See supra Part IV.A.
308. First English, 482 U.S. at 321.
We also point out that the allegation of the complaint which we treat as true
for purposes of our decision was that the ordinance in question denied appellant all use of its property. We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of
course do not deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the
case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which are not before us.
Id.
309. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 337.
310. Id. at 337-38.
311. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606.
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understandable that the Court would be hesitant to define “normal
delay.” The problem relates in part to the difficulty in defining delay,
which seems like a fact-laden concept and therefore inauspicious in
developing a per se rule. It also has to do with normal, which brings
up the question of reciprocity of advantage. It is normal that delays
in planning for residential neighborhoods might be relatively short,
and that delays in planning for very complex and stressed areas such
as the Tahoe Basin would extend much longer. There is an obvious
tension between normal delay as it pertains to the TSPC landowner’s
modest residential home and normal delay as it pertains to planning
for the conservation of large, complex, and nationally important environmental features.312
Justice Stevens adds that “even the weak version of petitioners’
categorical rule would treat these interim measures as takings regardless of the good faith of the planners, the reasonable expectations of the landowners, or the actual impact of the moratorium on
property values.”313 While good faith is expected of government officials, it is not a substitute for just compensation even under a jurisprudence based on fairness.
In short, “normal delay” is not a viable test for whether a planning
moratorium constitutes a taking. However, the fact that the duration
of a moratorium significantly exceeds the duration customary under
similar circumstances would greatly enhance the possibility that the
moratorium was compensable under the Tahoe-Sierra fairness test.
C. Moratoria in Excess of Specified Periods
[W]e could adopt a rule like the one suggested by an amicus supporting petitioners that would “allow a short fixed period for deliberations to take place without compensation—say maximum one
year—after which the just compensation requirements” would
“kick in.”314

A rule shifting a burden or a presumption and employing a somewhat arbitrary trigger is a common judicial technique. The Supreme
Court’s Miranda rule is a prophylactic measure to prevent abuse.315
The “individualized determination” and “rough proportionality” rules

312. For further discussion of reciprocity of advantage in this context, see supra Parts
III.C.4 and III.F.
313. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 338.
314. Id. at 333 (citing Brief for the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae 30) (citations
omitted). “Although amicus describes the 1-year cutoff proposal as the ‘better approach by
far,’ its primary argument is that Penn Central should be overruled.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535
U.S. at 333 n.28.
315. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (limiting admissibility of confessions).
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of Dolan v. City of Tigard316 similarly try to prevent abuse, since they
apply to discretionary exactions of property by administrators. Time
limits on planning moratoria would serve a similar prophylactic
function. However, Justice Stevens, quoting the majority in Palazzolo, declared that specific time limits on moratoria are “simply ‘too
blunt an instrument’ for identifying” cases of abuse.317 The fact that
many states have statutory time limits on planning moratoria was
duly noted in Tahoe Sierra as well,318 together with the observation
that “[f]ormulating a general rule of this kind is a suitable task for
state legislatures.”319
After Tahoe-Sierra, the idea of imposition of an arbitrary limit on
the duration of non-compensable development moratoria seems dead.
Nonetheless, the Court issued a rather direct warning that length
does matter: “It may well be true that any moratorium that lasts for
more than one year should be viewed with special skepticism.”320 Although the Court in Tahoe-Sierra found that the complexity of the
ecology of the Tahoe Basin resulted in the thirty-two month moratorium passing muster,321 future excess duration claims are by no
means precluded. In Eastern Minerals International, Inc. v. United
States, the court of federal claims found that a six year delay by the
Office of Surface Mining in considering a mining permit application
stated a takings claim based on alleged extraordinary delay.322 A year
later it awarded plaintiffs some $20 million.323
In Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit had earlier declared that unreasonable delay
would constitute a taking, albeit from the date when the government’s conduct became unreasonable.324 As a continued expression of
this more tempered view, the Federal Circuit reversed Eastern Minerals, under the name Wyatt v. United States.325 The court found that
if there were a delay, it was not “extraordinary.”326 “The length of the
316. 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (limiting scope of exactions as condition of development
permits).
317. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628).
318. Id. at 342 n.37.
319. Id. at 342.
320. Id. at 341.
321. Id.
322. 36 Fed. Cl. 541, 550-52 (Fed. Cl. 1996).
323. E. Minerals Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 621, 631 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (assessing takings damages).
324. 10 F.3d 796, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
325. 271 F.3d 1090 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
326. Id. at 1097-98 (noting that courts have “recognized that extraordinary delay must
be ‘substantial’ and that the Supreme Court has condoned delays up to ‘approximately
eight years’”). The court cited Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th
Cir. 1994); Judge Reinhardt’s Ninth Circuit panel opinion in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216 F.3d 764, 781-82 (9th Cir.
2000), concerning temporary development moratorium of up to forty months; and Dufau v.
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delay is not necessarily the primary factor to be considered when determining whether there is extraordinary government delay. Because
delay is inherent in complex regulatory permitting schemes, we must
examine the nature of the permitting process as well as the reasons
for any delay.”327 Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s recent decision
in Cooley v. United States328 noted that, pursuant to Tahoe-Sierra,
compensation based on an extraordinary delay claim would have to
take into account the life of the property remaining after the regulation is lifted.329
The case law is quite tolerant of long delays in the issuance of
permits, and landowners with larger projects are particularly susceptible to government’s assertion that delay arises from the complex
nature of the facts and policies to be evaluated. This suggests that
landowners would have a very difficult time raising an extraordinary
delay argument. However, unwarranted delays typically are associated with more than ineptitude. According to the Federal Circuit in
Wyatt, “it is the rare circumstance that we will find a taking based on
extraordinary delay without a showing of bad faith.”330 In Cooley, the
Federal Circuit reaffirmed that takings based on extraordinary delay
in the absence of bad faith are “rare creatures.”331
The Court in Cooley added that, “[i]n conducting a Penn Central
analysis, the trial court may weigh whether the [regulator’s] conduct
evinces elements of bad faith. A combination of extraordinary delay
and intimated bad faith, under the third prong of the Penn Central
analysis, influence the character of the governmental action.”332 Such
an analysis might be the key to a landowner prevailing in a planning
moratorium case. As it happens, an example of the genre of extraordinary delay coupled with bad faith might be found in Cooley itself.333
D. Rolling Moratoria
[W]ith the benefit of hindsight, we might characterize the successive actions of TRPA as a “series of rolling moratoria” that were
the functional equivalent of a permanent taking.334

United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 156, 163 (Cl. Ct. 1990), concerning permit delay of sixteen
months. See also Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (addressing a seven year delay).
327. Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098.
328. 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
329. Id. at 1306-07.
330. Wyatt, 271 F.3d at 1098.
331. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1307.
332. Id.
333. See infra text accompanying notes 379-92.
334. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
333 (2002) (citing Briefs for Petitioners and Petition for Writ of Certiorari).
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When should a series of related but ostensibly separate moratoria
on development be regarded as a single moratorium? This issue
seems implicit in the facts of Tahoe-Sierra and was explicitly raised
in TSPC’s petition for certiorari.335 The Supreme Court limited certiorari so as to exclude sequential moratoria and refused to discuss it on
the ground that its grant of review did not encompass that issue.336
Nonetheless, the Court did recite the finding below that “each of the
two moratoria was a separate taking, one for a 2-year period and the
other for an 8-month period.”337
1. Discerning When Moratoria Are Related
It is difficult to understand how each moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra
was a separate taking. As the Court acknowledged, “‘no regional plan
was in place as of that date’ [when the first moratorium terminated].
TRPA therefore adopted [the second moratorium]”.338 Furthermore,
as was not indicated in the Court’s opinion, between the expiration of
the first moratorium and the promulgation of the second was a gap.
The district court found that during this period the first moratorium
“was extended—although not by any affirmative action by TRPA,
and not, contrary to what the defendants have implied, for any set
period of time.”339 These facts clearly indicate that TRPA did not consider the moratoria to be separate.
In analyzing other aspects of post-Tahoe-Sierra development
moratoria, counsel are apt to focus on the facts as they existed at the
time the moratoria first were imposed.340 In considering whether sequential moratoria constitute one rolling moratorium, however, it is
335. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167).
2. Can a land use regulatory agency escape its constitutional duty to pay for
land taken for public use by the expedient of enacting a series of rolling, backto-back “temporary” moratoria/prohibitions extending over a period of 20 years,
and then claiming that each of the individual prohibitions on all use must be
viewed in isolation from the others and, when so viewed, none was severe
enough by itself to cross the constitutional taking threshold?
In similar fashion, can such an agency escape the constitutional obligation of
compensation because a court injunction issued in a different case barred issuing permits to other landowners, while the agency’s own regulations precluded
all use of the Petitioners’ land?
Id.
336. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334 (citing the grant of certiorari, 533 U.S. 948 (2001)).
337. Id. (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC
IV), 216 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).
338. Id. at 311 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency
(TSPC), 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1235 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764
(9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).
339. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1235.
340. The issue of “good faith,” for instance, would encompass the issue of whether regulators decided on a prolonged or indefinite moratorium at the outset that would be promulgated in stages for the purpose of misleading landowners and others. In such an event,
there would be one moratorium in substance although several moratoria in form.
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necessary to focus primarily on the facts as they exist at the time
each moratorium subsequent to the first is promulgated. It is helpful
to consider three hypothetical situations. In each, an initial moratorium is imposed so that planners could consider the implications of
rapid residential development in an agricultural area. In each as
well, a subsequent moratorium is imposed as the termination date of
the original moratorium is approaching.
• An earthquake just caused extensive damage in the area,
and the second moratorium was promulgated so that
building code standards pertaining to construction of
structures could be reconsidered.
• The subsequent moratorium is imposed because revision
of the locality’s comprehensive plan to deal with extraordinary growth will take longer than initially contemplated.
• The subsequent moratorium is imposed to consider the
need for a new regional waste treatment plant. It provides that a few low-water intensive uses may be established in certain areas. At the same time, the locality announces that it would buy land in the area at what plausibly is their (low) fair market value, given that the development freeze remains in place.
In the first hypothetical, involving the earthquake, it is highly
unlikely that a court would treat the moratoria as anything other
than separate. The imposition of the second moratorium is responsive to the new condition, something that hardly could have been
contemplated at the time the original moratorium was imposed. Put
in traditional land-use planning terms, the situation is analogous to
a changed condition.341 The landowners should be advised that the
validity of each moratorium would be judged on its own merits.
The second hypothetical involves what was, in retrospect, insufficient time for revision of the comprehensive plan. While there is no
evidence of bad faith, it is clear that there is an essential continuity
between the moratoria. The second moratorium truly is an extension
of the first and is responsive to the police power concerns that gave
rise to the first. From the perspective of an aggrieved landowner, the
two separate moratoria correspond to one continuing deprivation of
economic enjoyment. Justice Holmes admonished that “the question

341. See, e.g., City of Virgina Beach v. Va. Land Inv. Ass’n No. 1, 389 S.E.2d 312, 314
(Va. 1990) (striking down “piecemeal downzoning which was not justified by a change in
circumstances or prior mistake”).
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is what has the owner lost, not what has the taker gained,”342 and the
Supreme Court recently has reaffirmed that sentiment.343
In the second hypothetical, the owner’s loss results from the whole
of the extended moratorium. Were a court to rule otherwise, the effect
would be to encourage government regulators to devise initial moratorium expiration dates with the thought that needed extensions
could be promulgated later without adverse consequence to the
agency. In addition, of course, officials would be tempted to “low ball”
their estimates to mislead landowners and to enhance the chances
that subsequent courts would find each separate moratorium reasonable in duration.
The third hypothetical is the most difficult. On one hand, the need
for a waste treatment plant results from the increased demands for
water treatment that have been increasing up through the time the
second moratorium is imposed. However, urbanization often entails
the need for augmented sewage treatment. In the second hypothetical, the initial moratorium omitted sufficient time for the review.
Here, the initial moratorium omitted a necessary component from the
review. Once again there is a well-shaped property law rule that is
analogous, the “scope of the project” doctrine.344 It is quite likely that
the landowner could demonstrate that the government entity foresaw, or reasonably should have foreseen, that water treatment planning was a necessary component of planning for the transformation
of rural into more populated areas.
Thus, in the third hypothetical, the second moratorium would be
responsive not to conditions that arose at the time of its promulgation, but rather to conditions that existed at the time of the implementation of the original moratorium. This process also has a sound
grounding in traditional property law, in the doctrine of “relation
back” of subsequent actions to the substantive matters to which they
equitably are attached.345
In situations where the second moratorium is responsive to the
facts as they existed in full at the time the first moratorium was imposed, the relation back doctrine seems fully satisfactory. However, it
might be that the second moratorium plausibly relates to some extent to facts existing at the time the original moratorium was prom342. Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
343. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1419 (2003) (stating that “[t]his
conclusion is supported by consistent and unambiguous holdings in our cases” and quoting
Holmes in Boston Chamber of Commerce, 217 U.S. at 195).
344. E.g., Piedmont Triad Reg’l Water Auth. v. Unger, 572 S.E.2d 832, 835 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2002) (noting condemnee not entitled to compensation for value created in scope of
condemnor’s project).
345. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1291 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “relation back
[as] [t]he doctrine that an act done at a later time is considered to have occurred at an earlier time”).
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ulgated and to circumstances that reasonably should have been foreseen at that time, and partly to more recent events. Where the recent
events play a minor role in the decision to impose the second moratorium, relation back should be imposed. However, where the recent
events are the principal reason for imposition of the second moratorium, it might be more reasonable to ascribe the new moratorium to
changed conditions.
The fact that the second moratorium is imposed as a result of
events unforeseen at the time of the original moratorium does not
necessarily mean that the events are unrelated. It might be that the
first moratorium had both unintended, but foreseeable, consequences
to which the second moratorium was responsive. In such a case the
new circumstances relate to the acts of the regulator, and the regulator should not escape responsibility for its acts on the grounds that
they were unintended. This is another way of making the point that
the focus should be on what the owner has lost, not what the agency
has gained. The traditional property doctrine that covers this point
nicely is “tacking.”346 This point is similar to that underlying Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s attribution of the time period during which
TRPA’s 1984 Plan was enjoined to the agency.347 While the TahoeSierra majority declined to consider it,348 the argument certainly remains viable when properly raised.
An additional feature of the third hypothetical is that the second
moratorium does permit low-water intensity uses, perhaps synonymous with large lot residential development. Landowners in some
areas will be eligible to apply for such development and landowners
in other areas will not. That has implications for structuring litigation and for the reciprocity of advantage that might be associated
with the second moratorium. Also, the fact that the locality has announced a buy-out plan could be viewed alternatively as proof that no
individual landowner need regard the freeze on development as indefinitely locking up the value of his property, or as evidence of bad
faith349 akin to the deliberate creation of condemnation blight designed to further government’s acquisition of land on the cheap.350

346. See, e.g., Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 978 F.2d 1334, 1342-43 (4th
Cir. 1992) (noting that tacking is a doctrine allowing an adverse possessor to include the
occupancy of his predecessor with his own for purposes of the prescriptive period).
347. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
345 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 313-14 n.8.
349. See discussion infra Part IV.E; see also City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
350. See, e.g., Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1349-50 (Cal. 1972) (requiring compensation for damage resulting from precondemnation announcements when the
condemnor acts unreasonably by excessively delaying eminent domain action or by other
oppressive conduct).
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The regulator’s underlying intent to acquire the parcel, which it
continually disapproved development plans for, played an important
role in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.351 The
Supreme Court noted the landowner’s submission of evidence that
the city had earlier contemplated buying the parcel or inducing the
state to do so, had put money aside for that purpose, but had abandoned its plan for financial reasons.352 “The State of California’s purchase of the property during the pendency of the litigation may have
bolstered the credibility of Del Monte Dunes’ position.”353 In an earlier case, Agins v. City of Tiburon,354 the city had made an aborted attempt to acquire the owner’s spectacular ridgeline land overlooking
San Francisco through eminent domain before drastically cutting
back on its permitted housing density.355 The Supreme Court determined that there had not been a facial taking.356
2. Government Responses to Rolling Moratoria Claims
Governmental agencies might respond to a rolling moratoria claim
in several ways. The fact that landowners might insist that sequential restrictions should be considered along with their challenges to
the original moratorium might be asserted to be contrary to their argument that the first moratorium, in and of itself, constitutes a taking.357 Another argument is that details of the scope and stringency of
moratoria differ, so that subsequent moratoria “cannot remotely be
described, in substance, as a simple extension of the earlier moratorium.”358 Also, in the absence of full adjudication of subsequent moratoria, “no record exists to assess such a challenge on the merits.”359
It is important to recognize that one of TSPC’s central premises
went undisputed: temporary moratoria, standing alone or in combination, might be pretextual. If so, their substance might indicate
compensable takings.

351. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
352. Id. at 699-700.
353. Id. at 700.
354. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
355. Id. at 258 nn.1 & 3.
356. Id. at 262-63.
357. Brief for Respondents, Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1480565, at *27 n.9.
358. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation and Sierra Club in Support of Respondents,
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1597737, at *13-*14 (articulating this
description of Tahoe-Sierra, given the replacement of “the prior, flat prohibition on development” by a new plan providing “a series of flexible alternatives for landowners, including
the opportunity to develop certain lots; to sell transferable development rights; and to sell
the fee to the government”) (citations omitted).
359. Brief for Respondents, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL
1480565, at *27 n.9.
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Petitioners are entirely correct that an ostensibly temporary
measure might, in fact, be so long lasting or indefinite in duration
that it is a taking under Lucas. The courts are well equipped to
look behind labels to find the substance of things. Thus, owners
would certainly be entitled to allege, and courts might well find a
taking, if a measure labeled as a “moratorium” actually were intended to last indefinitely, or if the government enacted a continuous series of short-term moratoria, effectively creating a single,
permanent prohibition on development.360

As the oxymoron indicates, permanent moratoria are per se takings.361 But moratoria of lesser durations may be compensable as well
under the Penn Central analysis featured in Tahoe-Sierra.362 The
path is difficult, but not insurmountable. Furthermore, even the fact
that individual ordinances that together comprise sequential moratoria expire before judicial review can be obtained does not prevent judicial condemnation of such conduct.363
E. Lack of Good Faith as Indicative of Takings
[W]ere it not for the findings of the District Court that TRPA acted
diligently and in good faith, we might have concluded that the
agency was stalling in order to avoid promulgating the environmental threshold carrying capacities and regional plan mandated
by the 1980 Compact. Cf. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.364

“Good faith” occupies a rather amorphous position in American
property rights law, implicating both due process and takings analysis.365 The fact that a regulator acts diligently and in good faith does
not preclude the finding that there has been a taking. As Justice
Kennedy noted a year prior to his opinion for the Court in City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,366 the Takings Clause
“operates as a conditional limitation, permitting the [g]overnment to
do what it wants so long as it pays the charge.”367 It “presupposes

360. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Audubon Society, Natural Resources Defense
Council, National Wildlife Federation and Sierra Club in Support of Respondents, TahoeSierra, 535 U.S. 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL 1597737, at *13 (emphasis added).
361. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.
362. Id. at 321-25, 342.
363. See Mitchell v. Kemp, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (App. Div. 1991) (noting a recurring
controversy amenable to review, since the town “has replaced one moratorium law with
another and has been doing so for nearly five years”).
364. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333-34 (citing Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 698
(1999)).
365. See infra Part IV.F.
366. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
367. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 545 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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what the Government intends to do is otherwise constitutional.”368
Correspondingly, the general rule is that the presence of bad faith
does not, in itself, invalidate an otherwise reasonable land-use regulation.369 However, bad faith typically manifests itself through actions that make land-use decisions unreasonable.370 Furthermore, as
in other areas of property rights law, judges are apt to give good faith
a larger role in practice than it is accorded in theory.371
The Court apparently was persuaded by the truth of the landowner’s assertion in Del Monte Dunes that the city simply was not
going to grant a development permit, even though the landowner
complied with each of the steadily escalating demands imposed upon
it.372 Given Tahoe-Sierra’s emphasis on fairness and citation of Del
Monte Dunes in the good faith context,373 it is important to distinguish legitimate governmental development decisions from those
that treat like-situated individuals differently374 or those that fail to
substantially advance a legitimate governmental purpose.375
In Tahoe-Sierra, a lack of good faith may be evidenced by the fact
that TRPA’s 1981 plan marked not an interim regulation or a temporary freeze on development of lands belonging to TSPC members, but
rather the beginning of a ban on development that has continued
through this day. The need for a permanent ban seems to have been
obvious from the outset. Indeed, Justice Stevens quoted the Nevada
U.S. District Court to this effect:

368. Id.
369. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Fairfax, 146 Cal. Rptr. 687, 684 (Ct. App. 1978) (stating that the wrongfulness of a state action is not relevant in an inverse condemnation action).
370. See, e.g., Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3rd Cir. 1998)
((noting that a landowner had a substantial property interest and that a “substantive due
process violation is established if ‘the government’s actions were not rationally related to a
legitimate government interest’ or ‘were in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper
motive.’”) (quoting Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 692 (3d Cir.
1993) (quoting Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 683 (3d Cir.
1991))).
371. The classic study is R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61
WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 337 (1983) (examining a large number of cases and determining that
the good faith of an adverse possessor is often determinative in deciding ownership).
372. See infra text accompanying notes 394-402.
373. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 333-34.
374. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (validating “class of
one” deprivation of equal protection arising from unusual demand for a very wide municipal utility easement).
375. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (holding that “[t]he application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use
of his land”) (citation omitted); see also Chevron USA, Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030,
1042 (9th Cir. 2000) (asserting that state scheme of regulating contracts between gasoline
refiners and retail dealers did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest).
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Those areas in the Basin that have steeper slopes produce more
runoff; therefore, they are usually considered “high hazard” lands.
Moreover, certain areas near streams or wetlands known as
“Stream Environment Zones” (SEZs) are especially vulnerable to
the impact of development because, in their natural state, they act
as filters for much of the debris that runoff carries. Because “[t]he
most obvious response to this problem . . . is to restrict development
around the lake—especially in SEZ lands, as well as in areas already naturally prone to runoff,” conservation efforts have focused
on controlling growth in these high hazard areas.376
The evidence is quite convincing that further development on
high hazard lands such as the plaintiffs’ would lead to significant
additional damage to the lake. Thus, limiting such development
unquestionably satisfies the “essential nexus” part of the test.
There is a direct connection between the potential development of
plaintiffs’ lands and the harm the lake would suffer as a result
thereof. Further, there has been no suggestion by the plaintiffs
that any less severe response would have adequately addressed
the problems the lake was facing. Thus it is difficult to see how a
more proportional response could have been adopted.377

Of course, had TRPA asserted at the outset that preservation of
Lake Tahoe required that the landowners permanently be deprived
of their long-held and reasonable expectations of development, it almost certainly would have had to pay compensation. A jurisprudence
requiring government agencies to pay when they are forthright and
not to pay when they tell the truth slowly (or, more accurately, permit the truth to dawn slowly among the regulated) is pernicious. It
also is a glaring example of the kind of conceptual severance that the
parcel as a whole rule, freshly reasserted in Tahoe-Sierra, purports
to prevent.378
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled, in Cooley
v. United States,379 that extraordinary delay, generally coupled with
bad faith, could be considered by a court applying a Penn Central
analysis with respect to the third Penn Central factor—the character
of the governmental action.380 Cooley presents a case study of that interplay.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers denied Cooley’s application for
a wetlands fill permit, with the result that his land lost 98.8% of its

376. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1232 (D. Nev. 1999) (emphasis added),
rev’d in part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).
377. TSPC, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1240 (emphasis added).
378. 535 U.S. at 326-27; see also supra Part III.D.
379. 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
380. Id. at 1306 (citing Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 F.3d 796, 799 (Fed. Cir.
1993)).
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value.381 The owner asserted a taking and filed an action for compensation in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. In response, the Corps,
sua sponte, issued what it styled a “provisional permit,” although it
was labeled “DO NOT BEGIN WORK.”382 Furthermore, in apparent
violation of a federal regulation precluding the Corps from acting as
“a proponent [or] opponent of any permit proposal,” it “contacted and
convinced the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency to waive Cooley’s
application for a § 401 Water Quality Certification.”383 The Federal
Circuit observed:
In forming its litigation strategy, members of the Corps doubted
whether the Corps could issue legally valid permits after the 1993
denial. Nevertheless, the Corps ignored its previous findings and
analysis and issued the 1996 permits based on Mr. Lance Wood’s
“opinion” that the property consisted of degraded wetlands.
Mr. Wood was the Corps’ Assistant Chief Counsel for Regulation. Unlike the Corps’ engineers involved in the original evaluation of whether the land was wetland in 1990, Mr. Wood never visited the site in forming his opinion. Mr. Wood’s opinion was inconsistent with the Corps’ 1993 denial letter, initial evaluation, and
the “Evaluation and Decision Document.” Mr. Wood’s opinion did
not change the facts explained in the Corps’ thorough “Evaluation
and Decision Document” that the site was almost entirely a valuable wetland resource and that development on the site would be
contrary to public interest.384

The Federal Circuit recited other troubling facts as well. Cooley’s
application for a fill permit was denied by the Corps on the grounds
that he had not submitted sufficient information.385 However, only
weeks earlier it had received a recommendation from a Tim Fell at
the local Regulatory Functions Branch recommending that the Corps
‘“proceed with the decision based on the available information and
not hold a meeting’ to permit Cooley to submit additional information.”386 This was followed by an internal memorandum in which Mr.
Fell wrote: ‘“I think Cooley has provided enough information so we
can’t deny based on failure to provide adequate info. . . .’”387
In its decision below,388 the U.S. Court of Federal Claims had applied a Lucas per se test in considering the 98.8% diminution in the
value of Cooley’s land. The Federal Circuit ordered a remand, noting
381. Id. at 1300.
382. Id. at 1301.
383. Id. at 1303 (citing 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(a)(4) (1996)).
384. Id.
385. Id. at 1300.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. 46 Fed. Cl. 538 (Fed. Cl. 2000), aff’d in part, vacated in part by Cooley v. United
States, 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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that the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Tahoe-Sierra required a Penn Central multi-factor analysis unless there were a
‘“complete elimination of value.’”389 As part of its remand instruction,
it declared:
Here, the record indicates Cooley, after two years of disputing
the characterization of its property as protected wetlands, applied
for a wetlands fill permit under the Clean Water Act. The Corps
requested additional information on alternative sites suitable for
the proposed mixed development, information supplied by Cooley
in 1992. Based upon the information provided by Cooley, the Corps
denied the requested permit in 1993. The Corps continued to delay
action even after consulting an outside expert in 1995, whose report confirmed Cooley’s 1992 contention that suitable alternative
sites were unavailable. The Corps ultimately agreed with Cooley in
1996 that the parcel in question is indeed a degraded wetland. The
trial court should consider this sequence of events in determining
whether the Corps’ actions meet the criteria for a finding of extraordinary delay.
In the context of making this finding, the trial court may weigh
this court’s guidance that governmental agencies are best suited to
develop the technical information necessary to adequately process
a permit application. Accordingly, those agencies receive appropriate deference in acquiring technical information. However, in the
instant case the agency admits its requests for additional information were not necessary for issuing a permit. The trial court previously discounted the credibility of the Corps’ argument that the
permit denial letter requested additional information in an altruistic effort to issue a permit. In conducting a Penn Central analysis,
the trial court may weigh whether the Corps’ conduct evinces elements of bad faith. A combination of extraordinary delay and intimated bad faith, under the third prong of the Penn Central analysis, influence the character of the governmental action.390

As Cooley suggests, “extraordinary delay” and “bad faith” go hand
in hand.391 Among other indicia of them are:
• Requests for information previously supplied to the regulator.
• Requests for information that the regulator’s own technical staff deem unnecessary.
• Failing to provide specific reasons why permit applications fail to meet applicable standards.
389. Cooley, 324 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330) (citation omitted).
390. Id. at 1307 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
391. See id. at 1306-07 (noting the rarity of cases where the court will base a taking on
extraordinary delay and not couple it with a finding of bad faith).
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• Failure to provide specific criteria upon which subsequent amendments to submitted permit applications will
be evaluated.
• Shifts in technical or procedural requirements during the
time that the permit application is being considered.
• Escalation of requirements when submitted plan
amendments satisfy the articulated list of initial application defects or suggested application modifications (failure to take “yes” for an answer).
• Shifts in substantive agency positions on requirements
and procedures preliminary to litigation.
• Intercession with other regulators outside of normal
practices in processing permit applications.
• Intercession with third parties (such as the applicant’s
tenants or lenders) outside of normal permit processing
practices.
• Involvement of regulator’s legal staff in the formulation
of technical standards and policies or their application to
the landowner.
• Regulatory denials or prolonged application processing
where the regulator or another public body has tried to
purchase the parcel or rights in the parcel, or where government agencies or private groups with whom they have
a symbiotic relationship (e.g., environmental groups) are
interested (or induced) to want to acquire rights.392
With respect to each of these possible indications of bad faith, full
documentation is necessary. Landowners should request specific and
detailed information at every stage of the permit application and review process.
F. Moratoria Not Substantially Advancing a Legitimate
State Interest
[A]part from the District Court’s finding that TRPA’s actions represented a proportional response to a serious risk of harm to the

392. See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A
Unified Theory for Partial Takings Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589, 601 (2002) (noting
that needed studies must be diligently pursued and that moratoria for purposes of conducting studies unreasonable in scope have been set aside on substantive due process grounds).
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lake, petitioners might have argued that the moratoria did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest.393

1. The Importance of Del Monte Dunes
The Supreme Court’s decision in City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.394 is the first time that the Court has upheld
the payment of regulatory takings damages. Justice Kennedy’s opinion implicitly validated the landowner’s conclusion that “[a]fter five
years, five formal decisions, and 19 different site plans, . . . the city
would not permit development of the property under any circumstances.”395 The landowner sued in U.S. district court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging that the “denial of [its] final development proposal
was a violation of the due process and equal protection provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment and an uncompensated, and so unconstitutional, regulatory taking.”396 Del Monte Dunes is important in part
because its discussion of due process implicates the kind of meansends analysis implicit in judicial reviews of fairness—the leitmotif of
Tahoe-Sierra.
2. Moratoria Must Be Related to Legitimate Government Interests
In Del Monte Dunes, the district court retained for its own consideration the broad issue of whether the city’s development regulations
substantially advance legitimate public interests, as opposed to submitting it to a jury.397 Justice Kennedy approved, and asserted this
inquiry “is probably best understood as a mixed question of fact and
law.”398 More generally, the occurrence of a compensable taking “is a
question of law based on factual underpinnings.”399 The Court rebuffed the demand400 of the United States, which as amicus curiae,401
was insistent that the Court explain why the substantial advance-

393. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
334 (2002).
394. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
395. Id. at 698 (citation omitted).
396. Id.
397. Id. at 699.
398. Id. at 721.
399. Cooley v. United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
400. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 704; see also Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 1023-24 (2000).
401. While the city’s petition for certiorari did not refer to the first prong of Agins, the
Solicitor General’s amicus brief, in support of the city, proffered the following additional
question: “Whether a land-use restriction that does not substantially advance a legitimate
public purpose can be deemed, on that basis alone, to effect a taking of property requiring
the payment of just compensation.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (No. 97-1235), 1998 WL 308006, at Part *I.
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ment test of Agins v. City of Tiburon402 should be associated with the
Takings Clause as opposed to the Due Process Clause.
3. Moratoria Must Be Related to Specific Ordinances or
Regulations
The district court in Del Monte Dunes submitted to a jury the issues of whether the city’s repeated rejections of development proposals had deprived the owner of all economically viable use of the land
and whether its rejection of the landowner’s development plans bore
a reasonable relationship to the city’s articulated justifications. The
jury awarded the landowner a general verdict for damages.403 Justice
Kennedy emphasized that the jury had been “instructed, in unmistakable terms,” that the city’s purposes were legitimate, and that its
province “was confined to . . . the city’s particular decision to deny
Del Monte Dunes’ final development proposal.”404
[T]o the extent Del Monte Dunes’ challenge was premised on unreasonable governmental action, the theory argued and tried to the
jury was that the city’s denial of the final development permit was
inconsistent not only with the city’s general ordinances and policies but even with the shifting ad hoc restrictions previously imposed by the city. Del Monte Dunes’ argument, in short, was not
that the city had followed its zoning ordinances and policies but
rather that it had not done so. As is often true in § 1983 actions,
the disputed questions were whether the government had denied a
constitutional right in acting outside the bounds of its authority,
and, if so, the extent of any resulting damages. These were questions for the jury.405

Having established that § 1983 claims sound in tort,406 that just
compensation is a compensatory remedy at law,407 and that “Del
Monte Dunes was denied not only its property but also just compensation or even an adequate forum for seeking it,”408 the Supreme
Court upheld the district court’s decision to refer the petitioner’s
claim to the jury.409 Although a federal trial on a local land-use takings case is unusual,410 attorneys representing landowners undoubt402. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning law to particular
property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests . . . .”).
403. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 701.
404. Id. at 706.
405. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
406. Id. at 709.
407. Id. at 710-11.
408. Id. at 715.
409. Id. at 721.
410. In Del Monte Dunes, the taking arose prior to the Supreme Court’s determination
that states must provide a compensation remedy for temporary takings, and here the taking was temporary since the landowner sold the parcel to the state. Id. at 699-700 (citing
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edly will want to try to convince federal courts, and state courts
where permissible, to allow juries to hear issues relating to regulator
adherence to its own rules in many cases.
4. Meeting the Landowner’s Substantial Burden
Given Tahoe-Sierra’s strong endorsement of planning, it is
unlikely that a landowner successfully could challenge the police
power justifications articulated for development moratoria. If the
landowner is to prevail, it would be by convincing the finder of fact
that the government’s actions did not, in fact, comport with its articulated purposes.
The Supreme Court has not established definitive standards for
determining when land-use regulations and determinations deprive
owners of due process of law. Its cases do require that local land-use
laws have a substantial relation to legitimate state interests and
may not be arbitrary or capricious in their application to individual
parcels.411 “This standard reflects the consensus that a local government should enjoy wide-ranging latitude in regulating land use for
the public welfare, and reflects the truism that every land-use regulation, to some extent, chips away at property rights.”412 The various
standards employed by the courts of appeals recently were analyzed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
George Washington University v. District of Columbia.413 There, the
District imposed stringent conditions on student housing when it approved a special exception to the zoning ordinance for expansion of
the George Washington University (GW) campus. The court explained that “[i]n the land-use context courts have taken (at least)
two different approaches for determining the existence of a property
interest for substantive due process purposes.”414 While the Third
Circuit held that an ownership interest in the land qualifies,415 other
circuits “have focused on the structure of the land-use regulatory
process, . . . looking to the degree of discretion to be exercised by
state officials in granting or withholding the relevant permission.”416

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987)).
411. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187-88 (1928); Vill. of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
412. Kenneth B. Bley & Tina R. Axelrod, The Search for Constitutionally Protected
“Property” in Land-Use Law, 29 URB. LAW 251, 257 (1997).
413. 318 F.3d 203 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
414. Id. at 206-07.
415. Id. at 207 (citing DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 601 (3d Cir.
1995)).
416. Id. (citing Bituminous Materials v. Rice County, 126 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir.
1997); Gardner v. Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992); Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co.
v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991); Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256,
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The D.C. Circuit referred to this as a “‘new property’” inquiry, along
the lines suggested in Charles Reich’s seminal article.417
The D.C. Circuit declined to rule on whether an ownership interest was sufficient because GW met the “new property” standard.418
After outlining the “considerable variety in the courts’ formulae for
how severely official discretion must be constrained to establish a
new property,”419 it found the Eighth Circuit test, which “inquires
whether the ‘statute or regulation places substantial limits on the
government’s exercise of its licensing discretion,’”420 more in accord
with Supreme Court precedent.421
The finding of a property interest gives the property owner the
right to challenge a regulation. At that point, the D.C. Circuit continued,
the doctrine of substantive due process constrains only egregious
government misconduct. We have described the doctrine as preventing only “grave unfairness,” and identified two ways in which
such unfairness might be shown: “Only [1] a substantial infringement of state law prompted by personal or group animus, or [2] a
deliberate flouting of the law that trammels significant personal or
property rights, qualifies for relief under § 1983.”422

The court found no substantive due process violation, holding that
the regulation “merely requires the university to house its students
in a way that is compatible with the preservation of surrounding
neighborhoods.”423 In short, while GW might have had a good argument that the denial of its requested special exception was wrong, it
failed to demonstrate that bad faith led to, or was manifested in,
egregious misconduct by planning officials.
To be sure, however, there are governmental actions resulting in
property deprivations that are egregious by any standard; the coercive statement found by the court to have been made by the govern-

258 (11th Cir. 1989); RRI Realty Corp. v. Vill. of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 917 (2d Cir.
1989)).
417. Id.; see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (advocating property-like protections for social entitlements on which recipients justifiably could
form reliance interests).
418. George Washington University, 318 F.3d at 207.
419. Id.
420. Id. (quoting Bituminous Materials, 126 F.3d at 1070).
421. Id. (referencing Kentucky Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463 (1989)).
Thompson found discretion to be constrained by “substantive predicates,” such as an instruction that prison visitation may be denied when “the visitor’s presence . . . would constitute a clear and probable danger.” Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463.
422. Id. at 209 (quoting Silverman v. Barry, 845 F.2d 1072, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
423. Id. at 212.
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ment acquisition officer to obtain private land for a national park in
Althaus v. United States is an example.424
Substantive due process challenges to arbitrary and capricious
moratoria brought in state court have enjoyed more success. In
Anderson v. City of Issaquah,425 a case reminiscent of Del Monte
Dunes in its implications that the city was toying with the landowner, a Washington state appellate court held that “[i]t is unreasonable to expect applicants to pay for repetitive revisions of plans in
an effort to comply with the unarticulated, unpublished ‘statements’
a given community may wish to make.”426 A more recent Washington
case amplified that “case-by-case policymaking” wrongfully gave unrestricted discretion to local officials and administrators, a practice
judicially condemned in Anderson.427 Similarly, courts have struck
down moratoria with long and unjustified durations,428 as well as indefiniteness of duration coupled with lack of action to solve problems
ostensibly requiring the moratorium.429
G. Moratoria as Applied
[I]f petitioners had challenged the application of the moratoria to
their individual parcels, instead of making a facial challenge, some
of them might have prevailed under a Penn Central analysis.430

As a final theory, Justice Stevens suggested that the plaintiffs
might have attempted “as applied” challenges rather than “facial”
challenges. Stevens noted that the plaintiffs had “expressly dis-

424. 7 Cl. Ct. 688 (Cl. Ct. 1985).
I am in charge of acquiring lands for the National Park Service. Even though
we know what your lands are worth, we are going to try and get them for 30
cents on every dollar that we feel they are worth. Of course, you don’t have to
accept this 30 cents on the dollar. We will let you wait for a couple of years. If
you don’t take 30 cents on the dollar right now, you wait for a couple of years.
After a couple of years if you won’t take 30 cents on the dollar, we are going to
condemn it. We will condemn your property. You know what that is going to
mean? That means that you are going to have to hire an expensive lawyer from
the city and he is going to take one-third of what you get. Plus, you know who is
going to have to pay the court costs. You are. That is in addition to these expensive lawyers.
Id. at 691-92.
425. 851 P.2d 744 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
426. Id. at 755.
427. Pinecrest Homeowners Ass’n v. Glen A. Cloninger Assocs., 62 P.3d 938, 943
(Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
428. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kemp, 575 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (App. Div. 1991) (addressing a
variance application delayed for unexplained sequential moratoria extending over five
years).
429. Q.C. Constr. Co. v. Gallo, 649 F. Supp. 1331, 1338 (D.R.I. 1986), aff’d, 836 F.2d
1340 (1st Cir. 1987).
430. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
334 (2002).
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avowed” a Penn Central analysis and “did not appeal from the District Court’s conclusion that the evidence would not support” recovery under a Penn Central theory.431 Tahoe-Sierra requires that planning moratoria be evaluated through use of the Penn Central analysis, which “involves ‘a complex of factors including the regulation’s
economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation
interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action.’”432
1. Calculating the Economic Impact of the Temporal Dimension
The first enumerated Penn Central partial takings test is the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant.433 Use of a takings
fraction where the duration of the regulation is the numerator and
the life of the property is the denominator clearly is absurd in the
case of raw land, which has an indefinite life. Even in the case of
structures, there must be recognition that economic use to be enjoyed
in the future has a lower present value than equivalent economic use
enjoyed now.434
A special problem in assessing the economic impact of temporal
deprivations is that the fair market value of the deferred enjoyment
takes into account the possibility that the restriction will be abrogated. While this market factor legitimately is taken into account by
purchasers,435 the factor should not be considered by courts. Patently
ineffectual or unfair regulations are prime candidates for early abrogation—a fact that markets take into account. Therefore, lands subject to undesirable regulatory schemes are worth more than lands
subject to good ones, where the extent of deprivation is the same
while the regulation remains in force. The failure of judges to consider this would produce an anomalous understatement of the economic impact of bad regulations.

431. Id.
432. Id. at 315 n.10 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2002)), 32122 (indicating rule).
433. 438 U.S. at 124.
434. For discussion of appropriate measures of regulatory takings damages, see A.A.
Profiles, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 253 F.3d 576 (11th Cir. 2001), and Wheeler v. City
of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Cynthia J. Barnes, Comment,
Just Compensation or Just Damages: The Measure of Damages for Temporary Regulatory
Takings in Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1243 (1989); Gideon Kanner, Measure of Damages in Nonphysical Inverse Condemnation Cases, in 1989 INSTITUTE
ON PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 12 (Carol J. Holgren ed., 1989).
435. See, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). “A
speculative market may exist in land that is regulated as well as in land that is not, and
the precise content of regulations at any given time may not be particularly important to
those active in the market.” Id. at 1566.
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2. Planning Moratoria and Reasonable Investment-Backed
Expectations
The nature and ascendancy of reasonable investment-backed expectations has been analyzed earlier,436 so this discussion is limited to
expectations and planning moratoria. In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens’s opinion conveyed a whiff of the notion that the TSPC landowners got the treatment that they knew was coming, and therefore
should have avoided or deserved: “[P]etitioners ‘had plenty of time to
build before the restrictions went into effect—and almost everyone in
the Tahoe Basin knew in the late 1970s that a crackdown on development was in the works.’”437
In Good v. United States,438 a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit held that the “[r]easonable, investment-backed expectations are an element of every regulatory takings
case.”439 Furthermore, Good added, those expectations encompass not
only the regulations in place at the time an owner acquires an interest, but also the “regulatory climate” at the time of purchase that
might lead an owner to anticipate more stringent rules in the future.440 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,441 the Supreme Court rejected
the strong form of the “notice rule” theory, under which purchasers
could not assert takings challenges to preacquisition regulations.442
However, Justice O’Connor’s swing opinion on this point makes it
clear that there is some undefined relationship between preexisting
regulations and purchasers’ expectations—that the timing is “not . . .
immaterial.”443 More recently, the Court of Federal Claim’s opinion in
Walcek v. United States444 emphasized that “[w]hile the Penn Central
analysis anticipates reasonably foreseeable developments, it does not
require a property owner to be clairvoyant.”445
Faced with this body of precedent, the landowner should strive to
document both her intent to develop and also the unforeseeability at
the time of purchase of regulatory constraints that might be imposed
436. See supra Part III.B.
437. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 n.11 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC), 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1241 (D. Nev. 1999), rev’d in
part, remanded, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)).
438. 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
439. Id. at 1361. This assertion is contested with respect to per se takings. Another
panel of the Federal Circuit subsequently disagreed and the full court did not grant review
en banc to settle the conflict. See Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374
(Fed. Cir. 2000).
440. 189 F.3d at 1361-62.
441. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
442. Id. at 626-27; see Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U.
HAW. L. REV. 533 (2002).
443. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
444. 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (Fed. Cl. 2001), aff’d, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
445. Id. at 269.
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upon the parcel later. In the context of planning moratoria, such an
argument would focus upon the extent to which the duration or scope
of the moratorium exceeds that which reasonably could have been
contemplated.
3. The Character of Planning Moratoria
When the Supreme Court promulgated the “character of the governmental action” test in Penn Central, it established a clear referent—the distinction between physical invasions and the imposition of
police power regulations.446 Only four years later, however, the viability of the distinction was vitiated when the Court held that all permanent physical invasions are per se takings.447 As a result, character became a distinction in search of content. More recently, as Justice Holmes might have put it, the test has entered upon a “new career.”448
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,449 the Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of applying a law, intended to rescue a coal industry
retiree pension and medical benefit plan from insolvency, to a company that last engaged in the employment of miners, triggering the
application of the statute, many years earlier. The Court’s plurality
suggested that two factors relevant in considering the character of a
governmental action were the extent to which the action imposed
retroactive liability and the extent to which it singles out individuals
to bear burdens both substantial in amount and unrelated to promises they made or injuries they caused.450
The notion of targeting individuals to bear burdens was further
developed by Judge Eric Bruggink of the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims in American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States.451 There,
investors had constructed an extremely expensive, specialized, and

446. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). “A ‘taking’ may
more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” Id. at
124.
447. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
448. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula.
In the course of centuries, the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the
rule remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and
ingenious minds set themselves to inquire how it is to be accounted for. Some
ground of policy is thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with
the present state of things; and then the rule adapts itself to the new reasons
which have been found for it, and enters on a new career.
Id. at 5.
449. 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
450. Id. at 532-37.
451. 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (Fed. Cl. 2001).
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efficient fishing vessel. Competitors rallied against it and, apparently
at their behest, Congress enacted a modification of existing law that
“retroactively cancelled plaintiff’s existing permits and authorization
letter and prospectively precluded re-issuance of such permits. It is
undisputed that the only immediate impact of the rider was to invalidate the Atlantic Star’s current fishing permits. No other vessels
were affected by the legislative revocation.”452 After analyzing Eastern Enterprises, Judge Bruggink concluded that
the plurality used the familiar Penn Central template to conclude
that the medical benefits legislation at issue constituted a taking:
the economic impact, while not confiscatory, was “substantial;” the
plaintiff had good reason not to anticipate the imposition, thus it
had a reasonable, investment-backed expectation that the retroactive legislation would not have been adopted; and finally, the targeted nature of the legislation made the character of the government action appear to be a taking.453

Applying this analysis to the legislative deprivation of economic
use of the Atlantic Star, Judge Bruggink found that a severe economic loss resulted from the regulation; that the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the owners had been thwarted.454 On the
issue of character of the governmental action, he concluded that
there had been no alleged problem for which the plaintiff was
uniquely responsible and “[w]ithout this evidence of responsibility,
retroactively making the regulatory scheme unavailable to plaintiff
has no support. This retroactivity favors finding a taking.”455
While the liability phase of American Pelagic preceded TahoeSierra, the damages phase followed it. In his second opinion, Bruggink noted that Tahoe-Sierra required a determination of all “relevant circumstances:”456
In the present case, the “relevant circumstances” include the fact
that the character of the government action here strongly tends
toward a taking. Congress retroactively revoked plaintiff’s permits
in a targeted fashion. The Atlantic Star was the only vessel which
fell within the ambit of the 1997, 1998, and 1999 Appropriation
Acts. It is clear from the record that Congress’ decision was not the
result of a typical regulatory process. Instead, it was motivated by
political considerations directly aimed at the Atlantic Star. Congress’ action was far from being a routine delay in agency decisionmaking. There was no permit application pending. All permits had

452. Id. at 42.
453. Id. at 46.
454. Id. at 49-50.
455. Id. at 51.
456. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 575, 591 (Fed. Cl. 2003)
(awarding damages) (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335).
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been granted. No decision was held in abeyance pending fact finding. Congress simply decided not to allow the Atlantic Star to fish
using its previously issued permits. The character of the government action thus points to a taking. None of the Court’s concerns
in Tahoe about promoting deliberative regulatory consideration
apply.457

As previously discussed,458 the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Cooley
v. United States459 declared that “[i]n conducting a Penn Central
analysis, the trial court may weigh whether the [regulator’s] conduct
evinces elements of bad faith. A combination of extraordinary delay
and intimated bad faith, under the third prong of the Penn Central
analysis, influence the character of the governmental action.”460
Even apart from the question of good faith as such, the combination of Eastern Enterprises, American Pelagic, and Cooley suggests
that there is a continuum of situations in which the retroactivity,
targeting, and the impression of arbitrary or unfair dealing have
permeated the “character of the governmental action.”461 Landowners
may wish to employ analyses using these building blocks in many
types of factual situations. Assume, for instance, that a substantial
planning moratorium is employed at the behest of a competitor who
wishes to take over the landowner’s business location, perhaps on the
allegation of blight and through the intermediary of an urban redevelopment authority.462 Alternatively, assume the planning moratorium resulted from a process of selling condemnation powers463 or
squeezing out owners not making the highest possible contribution to
the municipal tax base.464 In all of these instances, the landowner
would have a viable argument that the character of the governmental action lends itself to a finding that there has been a compensable
taking.
The owners of the fishing vessel in American Pelagic “could have
reasonably anticipated a certain range of future governmental regulation, duly promulgated through the regulatory scheme Congress established. The targeted revocation of existing permits, however, and
the targeted denial of future permits by Congress were not events

457. Id. at 591.
458. See supra text accompanying notes 379-92.
459. 324 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
460. Id. at 1307.
461. Id.
462. Cf. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
463. Cf. Southwestern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., L.L.C., 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 880 (2002).
464. Cf. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d
1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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any citizen in a constitutional republic could have reasonably expected.”465
This analysis melds aspects of reasonable investment-backed expectations and permissible ways in which government could conduct
itself. Rules change, and property owners must expect that. However,
in a constitutional republic, rules do not change in ways that target
the property of selected individuals to bear burdens unrelated to
them. Where rules do act in such a fashion, their character augurs
for the finding that there has been a taking under the Penn Central
test. Landowners cannot rely upon the absence of planning and, Tahoe-Sierra, on the absence of reasonable planning moratoria. But
they should be able to rely on the absence of targeted and disproportionate moratoria.
4. The Difficulty of Litigating “as Applied” Challenges to Planning
Moratoria
Mounting “as applied” challenges to complex regulations where
there are hundreds of affected landowners of modest means is a difficult and financially improbable undertaking. When the Tahoe-Sierra
litigation commenced in 1981, regulatory takings law was in its infancy. Moreover, in cases alleging state or local deprivations of property rights, ripening an action for federal judicial review is very difficult. The Supreme Court’s Williamson County requirements466 are
both Byzantine467 and constitute “a special ripeness doctrine applicable only to constitutional property rights claims.”468 Whether the forum is a federal or state court, planning moratoria are especially difficult to challenge because moratoria might be extended, perhaps in
somewhat different form.
V. ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS FOR LANDOWNERS
A. The Meaning of the Tahoe-Sierra Dicta Is Uncertain
and Contestable
The holding of Tahoe-Sierra is narrow and the dicta are broad.
Much of the dicta assert principles like “parcel as a whole,” the im-

465. 49 Fed. Cl. at 49-50.
466. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985) (holding that landowner’s claim was not ripe because it had not yet obtained a final
decision regarding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to
the property).
467. See generally, John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the
“Ripeness Mess”? A Call for Reform so Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195, 200-01 (1999).
468. Timothy V. Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial Relegation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992).
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portance of planning, and the dichotomy between physical and regulatory planning jurisprudence. It is by no means clear, however, how
these abstract ways of looking at takings issues will be clarified when
exposed to hard cases that test them. Those who see broad precepts
in Tahoe-Sierra beyond the simple holding that sometimes moratoria
are justified and sometimes they are not should remember how narrowly the Court read First English. Justice Stevens was able to write
a majority opinion indirectly citing as controlling authority his own
dissent in First English itself.469 The author of First English, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, was left to cite its (at the time) heady dicta that
temporary takings “are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.”470
The present Court’s view in Tahoe-Sierra may prove as evanescent
as its dicta in First English.
The eminent contracts scholar Arthur Corbin long ago wrote:
When a stated rule of law works [an] injustice . . . the rule is
pretty certain either to be denied outright or to be undermined by
a fiction or a specious distinction. It is said that “hard cases make
bad law;” but it can be said with at least as much truth that hard
cases make good law. . . . When [common law judges’] stated rules
developed hard cases, the rules were modified by the use of fiction,
by exceptions and distinctions, and even by direct overruling.471

When confronted with the hard reality of specific cases, the broad
and perhaps naive references in Tahoe-Sierra may well require modification or repudiation.472 It thus is the task of the attorney representing the landowner to attempt to demonstrate that the TahoeSierra dicta violate the Court’s own fairness principles in the particular instance.
B. Selecting the Case and Framing the Issues
For institutional litigants such as large corporations or advocacy
groups, cases may be selected carefully, with the purpose of advancing the litigant’s desired outcome incrementally. Such litigants begin
with cases with the most appealing facts and seeking the most modest changes in existing law.473 For the private attorney retained by, or
469. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V),
228 F.3d 998, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from a denial of reh’g en banc).
470. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
471. Arthur L. Corbin, Hard Cases Make Good Law, 33 YALE L.J. 78, 78 (1923).
472. Examples might include unthinking application of the “parcel as a whole” doctrine
and indulgence in the assumption that planning moratoria always carry with them reciprocity of advantage.
473. A famous and highly successful example is that of the NAACP’s “‘litigation strategy’ against state-supported racially segregated schools, which it pursued ‘from the inception of the campaign in the mid-1920s to its culmination in the early 1950s.’” Steven H.
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volunteering to assist, particular landowners, such cherry picking of
cases is not an option.
In some Supreme Court property rights cases, the nature of the
facts may well have influenced the Court’s decision significantly. In
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,474 for instance,
the city, which previously attempted to buy the petitioner’s land,
turned down five development plans. The first was well in conformity
with the city’s regulations, and each subsequent plan satisfied the
city’s objections to the previous plan.
The summary of the facts in Justice Kennedy’s opinion fully incorporated Del Monte’s view that it had been toyed with.475 At the
oral argument, the city’s attorney asserted that the “case is not
atypical in some respects. The city was faced with a complex decision
it had to reconcile competing interests, sift through facts, and exercise its discretion and judgment, and it did so.”476 The Court was
openly incredulous. Justice Scalia said: “The landowner here essentially thinks that it was getting jerked around. . . . [I]sn’t there some
point at which . . . you begin to smell a rat, and at that point can’t we
say . . . this is simply unreasonable.”477 Justice Kennedy asked: Even
if the property has value, if the city is unreasonable and there is bad
faith, “isn’t the city still liable in damages for that unreasonable
treatment of the landowner?”478
While the City of Monterey might have convinced the Court that
its handling of the Del Monte Dunes project was not atypical, neither
it, nor its amici,479 benefited from the Justices’ inferences. It was
clear that the city that could not take yes for an answer made a poor
decision in seeking certiorari.

Wilson, Brown Over “Other White”: Mexican Americans’ Legal Arguments and Litigation
Strategy in School Desegregation Lawsuits, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 145, 147 (2003) (quoting
MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION,
1925-1950 at xi (1987)). The use of such strategies to preserve property rights has met with
vociferous objection. See Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P. Lord, The Takings Project: A
Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509,
510 (1998) (complaining of “a large and increasingly successful campaign by conservatives
and libertarians to use the federal judiciary to achieve an anti-regulatory, antienvironmental agenda”).
474. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
475. Id. at 695-700.
476. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Del Monte, 526 U.S. 687 (1999)
(No. 97-1235), 1998 WL 721087, at *4.
477. Id. at *16-17.
478. Id. at *19.
479. The list includes the National League of Cities, the American Planning Association, and many states.
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After Tahoe-Sierra, Richard Lazarus, a respected, albeit not disinterested, commentator,480 wrote that “[t]he property rights movement
and its counsel simply overplayed their hand in Tahoe-Sierra.”481
Undoubtedly property rights groups had grown accustomed to their
string of victories. Some might have forgotten that Justice Kennedy
had not joined in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Lucas,482 and
that Justice O’Connor had signaled her discomfort with per se rules
in her concurring opinion in Palazzolo.483 However, TSPC’s counsel
had crafted a certiorari petition responsive to Judge Reinhardt’s
Ninth Circuit opinion, which apparently decreed that a development
moratorium never constituted a taking.484 When the Court granted
certiorari on the inverted question of whether a development moratorium always constituted a taking, it awarded the broad middle
ground to the respondent. Most likely, that led Justices O’Connor
and Kennedy to join with the liberal wing of the Court.
Both Tahoe-Sierra and the case it brought back to undisputed
preeminence in the takings area, Penn Central, involved preservation
of iconic American treasures. In both, the Court showed great solicitude for conservation plans. Justice Brennan’s Penn Central opinion
barely mentioned the separate ownership of the air right above
Grand Central Terminal in the summary of facts and did not refer to
that owner (and co-petitioner) in the analysis.485 Perhaps the moral is
clear—establishing favorable legal precedents is doubly difficult in
cases where the object of regulation is beloved.
As noted earlier, the framing of the legal issues by the Court was
an immeasurable obstacle to the landowners challenging the regulations in Tahoe-Sierra. According to Professor Lazarus, the regulators
worked to achieve that result:
Perhaps the most important decision made by government counsel
at trial was to litigate, rather than stipulate, the factual issues
pertaining to Penn Central. The resulting trial record prompted a
series of favorable factual findings by the trial judge that both precluded any effective appeal of that judge’s Penn Central ruling by
the landowners and created a very sympathetic factual context for
TRPA in the Supreme Court. . . . [O]ne factor was present in Tahoe-Sierra that had been missing in prior regulatory takings cases:
an effective brief in opposition to the petition. . . . The government
won Tahoe-Sierra because of the narrowness of the legal issue con480.
Agency,
(2002).
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.

Professor Lazarus had argued for TRPA in Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
520 U.S. 725 (1997), and was on brief for TRPA in Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302
Lazarus, supra note 96, at 15.
See 505 U.S. at 1032 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
533 U.S. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
For discussion of the petition for certiorari and its inversion, see supra Part II.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116 (referring to UGP Properties, Inc.).
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sidered by the Court: whether TRPA’s 32-month moratorium on
development amounted to a per se Lucas taking in a facial challenge.486

Undoubtedly the government’s victory in Tahoe-Sierra will make
it more difficult for landowners to litigate unchallenged on broad and
not well differentiated legal grounds. Given the Supreme Court’s (selective) proclivity not to entertain issues not litigated below, and the
reluctance of inferior courts to modify existing doctrines, laying the
groundwork for extending property protection must begin early.
C. Building a Record
Landowners must anticipate the need for hindsight. It is, after all,
only in retrospect that a court might discern that a single or aggregated moratorium of compensable duration has been put in place.487
This means that counsel must insist on making a proper record at
every turn. The failure to do this can lead to disaster. In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,488 the law of the case, all of the way
through the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision, was that the landowner
had suffered a total deprivation of economic enjoyment of his land. It
is not clear that a single Justice believed this to be true, but the
State had waived the issue in the trial court.489 Likewise, in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,490 counsel for the
landowner failed to contest the city’s (incorrect) contention that it derived a reasonable return from its operation of Grand Central Terminal, thus leading to erroneous conclusions when the Court applied
the two economic factors of its new three-factor test.491 Landowners
cannot assume that regulators expecting to win on overarching theories will continue to give up practical points, as they had in Lucas.
This process can be very daunting, especially since new restrictions are implemented even while existing ones are being adjudicated. In Tahoe-Sierra, for instance, the fact that TSPC did not file
new lawsuits within one or two years after TRPA promulgated its
1987 Plan was the basis for the district court and Ninth Circuit’s
holding that TSPC’s suit could not be amended to include them because the statute of limitations had run. Therefore, the Supreme
486. Lazarus, supra note 96, at 17.
487. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 333 (2002) (observing that “with the benefit of hindsight, we might characterize the
successive actions of TRPA as a ‘series of rolling moratoria’”).
488. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
489. See id. at 1009 (stating the finding), 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the Court was “[r]elying on an unreviewed (and implausible) state trial court finding
that this restriction left Lucas’ property valueless”).
490. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
491. See William W. Wade, Penn Central’s Economic Failings Confounded Takings Jurisprudence, 31 URB. LAW. 277, 286-87 (1999).
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Court deemed petitioners to have waived objection to the 1987 Plan
and did not consider its freeze on development since 1987 in considering whether TRPA had imposed a rolling moratorium.492 As counsel
subsequently retained for the Supreme Court proceedings put it,
these rulings “required the lower courts to conclude that the landowners had a duty to file new suits against TRPA at the very time
they were fighting for their litigational live [sic] pursuing two Ninth
Circuit appeals in an effort to reinstate their initial suits.”493
The Supreme Court could have heard claims relating to the 1987
plan under the theory that there was a continuing wrong. Indeed,
that is precisely what the Court did in United States v. Dickinson.494
There, thirteen years before Armstrong,495 Justice Frankfurter recognized that “[t]he Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness.”496 He built upon this to uphold just compensation claims that
would have been time-barred if the landowner had to file his action
at the earliest possible moment:
The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and not a
technical rule of procedure enshrining old or new niceties regarding “causes of action”—when they are born, whether they proliferate, and when they die. We are not now called upon to decide
whether in a situation like this [alleged taking by deliberate permanent flooding] a landowner might be allowed to bring suit as
soon as inundation threatens. Assuming that such an action would
be sustained, it is not a good enough reason why he must sue then
or have, from that moment, the statute of limitations run against
him. If suit must be brought, lest he jeopardize his rights, as soon
as his land is invaded, other contingencies would be running
against him—for instance, the uncertainty of the damage and the
risk of res judicata against recovering later for damage as yet uncertain. The source of the entire claim—the overflow due to rises in
the level of the river—is not a single event; it is continuous. And as
there is nothing in reason, so there is nothing in legal doctrine, to
preclude the law from meeting such a process by postponing suit
until the situation becomes stabilized.497

Cases subsequent to Dickinson not only have included the case
that gave what Tahoe-Sierra now deems the “Armstrong principle,”498
492. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 313 n.7 (noting that “this claim was barred by California’s 1-year statute of limitations and Nevada’s 2-year statute of limitations” and that “the
validity of the 1987 plan is not before us”). For a treatment of rolling moratoria, see supra
Part IV.D.
493. Brief for Petitioners, Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 302 (No. 00-1167), 2001 WL
1692011, at *9 n.11.
494. 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
495. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
496. Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 748.
497. Id. at 748-49 (emphasis added).
498. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321.
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but also the Williamson County499 line of cases emphasizing the need
to determine the actual scope of land-use restrictions. Chief Justice
Rehnquist quoted one of those cases, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates
v. Yolo County,500 in his Tahoe-Sierra dissent: ‘“A court cannot determine whether a regulation has gone “too far” unless it knows how
far the regulation goes.’”501 While Rehnquist was referring to the majority’s refusal to consider TRPA’s 1984 plan,502 his point applies
equally well to the 1987 plan.
The Supreme Court might have considered the 1987 plan in spite
of the Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary. The majority might
have invoked the theory of continuing wrong in Dickinson,503 or simply ignored its own limitation on its grant of certiorari. As noted earlier, in a property rights case decided a year after Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens made a larger stretch than is implied here.504
As Tahoe-Sierra now leaves the matter, however, landowners are
in a substantial bind. Where there is one definitive moratorium at issue, they may apply the Supreme Court’s admonition in Suitum v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency505 and Williamson County506 that
“[a] taking challenge does not ripen ‘until the administrative agency
has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply
the regulations at issue to the particular land in question.’”507 Where
the landowner’s case is buttressed by the argument that sequential
moratoria show either lack of good faith in the promulgation of the
first moratorium or an aggregate moratorium of compensable duration, however, the landowner is in a quandary.
A suit filed too early, and therefore bereft of the augmented claims
arising from the subsequent moratorium, might be rejected by the
court as not rising to a compensable taking. A suit filed after subsequent moratoria are in place might be deemed to have waived the
initial moratorium, now barred by a statute of limitations. Separate
lawsuits filed subsequent to the imposition of each moratorium or
similar act seem to be necessary. Each should recount that the deprivations suffered by the landowner that constitute the asserted taking

499. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985).
500. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
501. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting MacDonald,
477 U.S. at 348 and citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
502. See id. at 343-44.
503. 331 U.S. at 745; see supra text accompanying notes 494-97.
504. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 123 S. Ct. 1406, 1417 (2003); see supra text accompanying notes 255-59.
505. Suitum, 520 U.S. 725 (1997).
506. Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
507. Beekwilder v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 54, 60 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (quoting Suitum,
520 U.S. at 737, which quoted, in turn, Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191).
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should be considered jointly and severally with previous moratoria.
Each also should explicitly reserve the right to seek to amend pleadings and to file future actions based on subsequent moratoria. Landowners should seek to join new lawsuits with existing suits where
there is a continuity of governmental conduct and objectives. This
holds true especially where subsequent moratoria might be demonstrated to be responsive to conditions in existence at the time the
earlier moratoria were imposed, and not to changed conditions.508
D. Tahoe-Sierra Helps Landowners Subject to Unfair Deprivations
of Property
Tahoe-Sierra mandates a jurisprudence of development moratoria
based on principles of fairness and Penn Central analysis. In the
process, it affirmed the compensability of partial takings.509 The challenge for landowners will be to convince courts to apply fairness criteria consistently.
Had Tahoe-Sierra adopted a per se approach, landowners would
have to focus on bright-line rules. However, Tahoe-Sierra adopted an
ad hoc approach that considers the “complex of factors including the
regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which
the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.”510 This orientation, plus the impossibility of treating some of Tahoe-Sierra’s dicta
completely literally, gives landowners considerable latitude. Stressing the notion of fairness to raise the connection between parcel as a
whole, and taking as a whole511 is a key example.
E. Measuring Success
The tools suggested by Tahoe-Sierra’s seven theories can be employed to prevail in litigation under the Penn Central ad hoc test in
federal court, should the Williamson County ripeness criteria be
met,512 and especially in state court. While it would be difficult for
landowners to establish the egregious violations of substantive due

508. See supra Part II.A.1.
509. See supra Part II.D.6.
510. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 315 n.10 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 617 (2001)).
511. See supra Part III.D.
512. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 172; see also Stephen E. Abraham, Williamson County Fifteen Years Later: When Is a Takings Claim (Ever) Ripe?, 36 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 101 (2001) (suggesting strategies for transcending ripeness problem); cf.
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Accepting the Relegation of Takings Claims to State Courts: The Federal Courts’ Misguided Attempts to Avoid Preclusion Under Williamson County, 26
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1999).
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process that federal courts require,513 similar criteria for arbitrary
and capricious behavior may be employed in actions brought in state
court under the Federal Constitution or the state’s constitution.
While hard-fought victories in appellate courts greatly satisfy
lawyers, clients are usually better off with negotiated settlements
that permit viable projects with minimal delays. Since Tahoe-Sierra
provides landowners viable causes of action, there is an incentive for
planning officials to compromise. The outcome of negotiations with
regulators is not a zero-sum game. “Just as American companies
have become more competitive through increased efficiencies and
productivity, improvements in how government regulates can greatly
diminish the damage to private property and the potential for takings.”514 The most basic goal is to ensure that state statutory or case
law has provided a foundation that protects owners’ rights when
moratoria are imposed and interprets it reasonably.515 Planning
moratoria should specifically identify their objectives.516 They also
should encourage reasonable interim use of the affected property. Interim development ordinances (IDOs) promote this end. As distinct
from planning moratoria, IDOs permit land-uses in developing areas
while permanent regulations are developed. They also may permit
discretionary approvals for projects that are not inconsistent with the
goals of the long-term plans under development. When coupled with
a vested rights ordinance, they can provide the landowner with assurance that in appropriate situations the undertaking of projects
during the interim period give rise to vested rights.517 Ensuring that
planning and other officials actually are working on providing the infrastructure and solving the problems upon which the moratoria
were predicated is also important.
VI. CONCLUSION
Planning moratoria are a valuable tool for planners and local governments. They give government the power to deal with impending
513. See supra Part IV for a discussion on why it is not impossible for landowners to
establish the egregious violations of substantive due process that federal courts require.
514. Dwight H. Merriam, Reengineering Regulation to Avoid Takings, 33 URB. LAW. 1,
2 (2001).
515. See, e.g., Almquist v. Town of Marshan, 245 N.W.2d 819 (Minn. 1976).
A property owner does not have an absolute right to obtain from a town board a
permit to use his land in the manner contemplated by an existing zoning ordinance. A moratorium on the issuance of such permits is valid if (a) it is adopted
by the town board in good faith; (b) it is not discriminatory; (c) it is of limited
duration; (d) it has for its purpose the development of a comprehensive zoning
plan; and (e) the town board acts promptly to adopt such plan.
Id. at 820 (quoting from the syllabus by the court).
516. See Dwight H. Merriam & Gurdon H. Buck, Smart Growth, Dumb Takings, 29
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,746, 10,756 (1999).
517. Id.
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growth, which genuinely and reasonably is unexpected, and which,
therefore, it would have been inefficient to anticipate. On the other
hand, moratoria may reflect lack of planning or bad planning. In any
event, the moratorium is inevitably a departure from the ideal of the
rule of law being the enunciation of clear rules, announced in advance.518 Since moratoria and subsequent land-use planning occur in
the context of specific types of projects, sponsored by specific individuals or groups, opportunities for favoritism and extortion are rife.
Our post-Tahoe-Sierra jurisprudence of planning moratoria gives
less security to landowners than one based on bright doctrinal lines
intended to protect property rights. However, Tahoe-Sierra is based
on fairness, and that framework promises landowners the possibility
of redress to those who have suffered an arbitrary deprivation of development rights.
More importantly, the availability of effective mechanisms to challenge arbitrary deprivations gives some pause to officials who might
be tempted to engage in them. By refusing to uphold the Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of the per se constitutionality of temporary development freezes,519 the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra confirmed that
there is no bifurcation of individual rights dependent upon whether
possible infringements of those rights are labeled permanent government policy or temporary government policy.520
Tahoe-Sierra should be read as an admonishment that land-use
regulators act in heavy-handed fashion only at their peril. Affirmative use of the “seven theories” roadmap that Tahoe-Sierra itself establishes provides a vehicle for vindication of landowner rights
threatened with unreasonable planning moratoria.

518. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1997) (elucidating five basic elements of the rule of
law: (1) capacity (rules must be able to guide people in their affairs); (2) efficacy (rules actually do serve to guide people); (3) stability (the rule must be reasonably stable so that
people can plan and coordinate their actions over time); (4) supremacy of legal authority
(the law should rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens); and (5) impartiality (courts should enforce the law and use fair procedures)).
519. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
328 (2002); see supra Part II.C.
520. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC V),
228 F.3d 998, 1001 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from a denial of reh’g en
banc) (“Governmental policy is inherently temporary while land is timeless.”).

